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24 June 1985

USSR REPORT
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No 2, February 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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MILITARY HISTORY

ARMY GEN BATOV RECALLS EAST POMERANIAN OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 85 (Signed to press 24 Jan 85) pp 14-20

[Article by Army Gen P. Batov, twice Hero of the Soviet Union*: "On the 40th Anniversary of the East Pomeranian Operation"]

[Text] By the beginning of February 1945 the Soviet Army had liberated a considerable part of Poland and taken the combat operations into fascist Germany. Berlin was only 60 kilometers away. The enemy had managed to hold on to East Pomerania, however, from where it was planned for forces of the Vistula Army Group to carry out a powerful counterthrust against the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, to route it north of the Warta River, to fortify themselves in Pomerania and consolidate their position on the Berlin axis.¹

The enemy's Pomeranian grouping posed a serious threat to our troops operating on the main, Berlin, axis. Headquarters, Supreme High Command, issued a directive on 8 February 1945, assigning the mission of destroying it to the 2nd Belorussian Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovskiy), relieving his forces of the need to participate in the East Prussian Operation.

The 2nd Belorussian Front (five combined-arms armies and an air army, three separate tank corps, a mechanized and a cavalry corps), with the assistance of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (commanded by Admiral V.F. Tributs, began the offensive on 10 February 1945, without a pause in operations. The troops advanced slowly, however. They were affected by the adverse conditions of the spring thaw, the wooded and swampy terrain, poor flying weather and stiff enemy resistance from prepared defense lines. Furthermore, the front forces had suffered extensive losses during the offensive in East Prussia, they were exhausted and needed a rest. At the beginning of the operation 26 of the 45 rifle divisions were at no more than 35 percent of their full strength on average, and the others had only 42 percent of their TOE personnel. The forces had only 263 tanks in serviceable condition.²

The front forces were engaged in fierce fighting, but were halted by the end of 19 February on a line running from Gniez through Cersk and Hojnica to Raciborz.

*During the East Pomeranian Operation Col Gen Pavel Ivanovich Batov was commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front's 65th Army.


From 16 to 20 February the Vistula Army Group undertook a counterthrust from the area of Altdamm and Starogard in the general direction of Landsberg with the objective of entering the rear area of Soviet forces north of Kostrzyn on the Oder. In the situation which had developed, it was essential to route the enemy's East Pomeranian grouping before making the decisive attack on Berlin. It was apparent, however, that the 2nd Belorussian Front lacked the forces to accomplish this mission. The right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) was therefore drawn into the operation.

It was the plan of Headquarters, Supreme High Command, to break up the opposing Vistula Army Group with thrusts by the 2nd Belorussian Front in the general direction of Koslin and and by the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front toward Kolberg, to cut most of it off from the main Wehrmacht Forces and destroy it, interacting with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (see diagram page 3). After capturing the city of Koslin and reaching the Baltic Sea coast, forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to deploy on a front facing east and advance on Danzig and Gdynia, to clear the enemy from the eastern part of Pomerania and capture all the parts between Danzig and Kolberg. In the course of the offensive, forces of the 1st Belorussian Front were to turn west, advance to Pomeranian Bay and clear the enemy from the right bank of the Oder from its mouth to Ceden. It was planned to begin the offensive on 24 February in the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front and on 1 March in that of the 1st Belorussian Front.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet was ordered to cut off the enemy's naval lines of communication in the southern part of the Baltic Sea with active operations by aircraft, submarines and torpedo boats, and to assist forces of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts in the capture of the coastline between the mouths of the Vistula and Oder.

In order to rapidly break through the enemy's defense and route its 11th Army, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front decided to create a powerful strike group east of Arnswalde with a view to completing the assigned mission within 6-7 days.³ If a surprise attack were made, in his estimation, the enemy would be unable to transfer significant forces to that area, and the switch to an offensive simultaneously on several sectors would prevent the Hitlerite command from making effective use of its operational reserves. These assumptions were confirmed in the course of the operation.

Despite the time limitation and the complexity of the situation on the fronts, all of the planned measures for organizing the forthcoming offensive were carried out in time, and the regrouping of forces was accomplished. In the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 19th Army, which had arrived from the reserve, Headquarters, Supreme High Command, replaced the 70th Army's left-flank formations and part of the 1st Belorussian Front's 3rd Assault Army, which regrouped from the right wing to an area east of Arnswalde. The 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies also moved to that area. The artillery regrouping was a considerable one. In the 2nd Belorussian Front, for example, one-third of all the reinforcement artillery was regrouped into the 19th Army's zone, and in the 1st Belorussian Front, 73 percent of its total strength was moved to the zone of the 3rd Assault Army and the 61st Army, which were making the main thrust.⁴



East Pomeranian Offensive Operation, 10 February-4 April 1945

Key:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Red Banner Baltic Fleet | 16. Gdynia |
| 2. Front line at end of (Feb 45 | 17. Sopot |
| 3. Axes of thrusts by Soviet | 18. Danzig |
| forces between 10 Feb and | 19. Vistula |
| 4 Apr | 20. Koslin |
| 4. Axes of thrusts of Polish | 21. Kolberg |
| 1st Army | 22. Kammin |
| 5. Counterthrusts and withdrawal | 23. 3rd Assault Army |
| of German fascist forces | 24. Swinnemund |
| 6. Front line at end of 23 Feb | 25. West Stettiner Haff |
| 7. Front line at end of 5 Mar | 26. Army Group Vistula |
| 8. Front line at end of 4 Apr | 27. Part of White Sea Fleet |
| 9. Defense lines, fortress-cities | 28. Neustettin |
| and strongpoints of German | 29. Rummelsburg |
| fascist forces | 30. 3rd Assault Army |
| 10. Hel Peninsula | 31. Stettin |
| 11. Hel | 32. Altdamm |
| 12. 1st Guards Tank Army | 33. Oder |
| 13. 6th Tank Corps | 34. Grudziadz |
| 14. 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps | 35. Bydgoszcz |
| 15. Stolp | 36. Piric |
| | 37. 1st Belorussian Front |

With the regrouping, the fronts had succeeded in building up the necessary superiority in personnel and equipment on the main axes. Our forces surpassed the enemy almost 3-fold in infantry, 2-fold in tanks and 3-fold in guns on the 17-kilometer breakthrough sector on the axis of the main thrust in the 2nd Belorussian Front.⁵

The crucial nature of the operation's objection and the nature of the operational maneuver by the front forces (a cleaving thrust at the center and subsequent operations on diverging axes) made it necessary to involve the maximum number of mobile forces. A total of two tank armies, six separate tank and mechanized corps, three cavalry corps and separate tank brigades, as well as tank and self-propelled artillery regiments, were involved in the offensive in the two fronts.

The operations by the assault groupings of the fronts on axes remote from each other demanded precisely organized interaction, support for their flanks and additional steps to achieve stable control.

Vigorous party-political work was performed in the forces. It was designed to produce a surge of aggressive spirit in the fightingmen and to achieve swiftness and determination of action in the enemy's defensive depth. The efforts of political organs, party and Komsomol organizations focused primarily on explaining the missions assigned to the troops. The main slogan continued to be: "Finish Off the Fascist Beast in His Own Den"! At the same time, the front political organs were appealing to the fightingmen to treat the German population humanely.

"Front forces were to switch to the offensive on 24 February," Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovskiy recalled. "Actually, however, the fighting began on 22 February: the enemy forestalled us and began active operations everywhere in an attempt to drive our units back. Determined battles broke out over the entire front. To our good fortune, the exception was the sector on which forces of the 1st Belorussian Front were being replaced by 19th Army units."⁶

The offensive by forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front's left wing was renewed on 24 February. The very first day 19th Army formations succeeded in penetrating the enemy's defense to a depth of 10-12 kilometers. The 3rd Guards Tank Corps which was introduced into the breach on the morning of 25 February, advanced 40 kilometers that day. Forces of the 70th Army encountered stiff army resistance and succeeded in advancing only 4-6 kilometers in two days and nights, while other front armies continued to engage in combat operations on the previous lines.

The offensive in the front's zone developed successfully after that. On 3 March the 3rd Guards Tank Corps reached the Baltic Sea coast and, together with 19th Army formations, captured the city of Koslin. The routes of withdrawal to the west for the grouping of German fascist forces operating in East Pomerania had been cut off.

The 1st Belorussian Front's right wing switched to an offensive on 1 March. The 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, which were committed to the engagement the very first day, significantly strengthened the thrust by the combined-arms formations. Developing a swift offensive, the 1st Guards Tank Army reached the Baltic Sea coast in the area of Kolberg and (Deyep) on 4 March. Forward formations of the 2nd Guards Tank Army reached the Oder in the area of Kammin the following morning. The enemy's East Pomeranian grouping had been broken up.

For purposes of destroying the enemy's scattered groupings, Headquarters, Supreme High Command, ordered the 3rd Belorussian Front to continue advancing toward Danzig with forces of its right wing and toward Lauenburg and Gdynia, and to reach the Baltic Sea coast along the entire zone no later than 20 March.

Carrying out the directive from Headquarters, the 2nd Belorussian Front continued its offensive on the northern and eastern axes. The 1st Guards Tank Army, which was attached to it and which had been committed to the engagement, reached the shore of the Bay of Danzig north of the port of Gdynia on 12 March. Overcoming determined enemy resistance, forces at the center and on the right wing of the front penetrated the defense lines, reached the shore of the Bay of Danzig and captured the city of Sopot. The enemy's Danzig grouping had been cut in two.

I recall the evening of 13 March 1945, when we received the directive from the front commander, which assigned our 65th Army the mission of being prepared to storm Danzig on the morning of 16 March, interacting with the formations of the 2nd Assault Army and the 49th Army. The army staff prepared the troops to execute the mission while continuing to engage in fierce fighting. Danzig was stormed by all three of the army's rifle corps. In each formation, depending upon the situation, several assault forces advanced in front. The division commanders kept reserves and used them to secure captured streets, blocks and large buildings. The entire regimental and division artillery was used for firing by direct laying. The long-range fire groups suppressed targets at the request of the commanders of divisions and assault forces. The heavy artillery was concentrated under the commander of the army artillery. From the army observation post, we continuously directed the combat operations of the formations and assault forces. And so, success was achieved as a result of the thorough preparations, close interaction among all the branches of troops and the mass heroism of soldiers, sergeants and officers.

Formations of the 70th and 19th Armies captured the city of Gdynia on 28 March, and forces of the 2nd Assault Army and the 65th and 49th Armies completed the routing of the enemy's Danzig grouping and captured fortress-city Danzig on 30 March.

The Polish 1st Heroes of (Vesterplyatte) Tank Brigade took part in the fighting to liberate the cities of Danzig and Gdynia. Its soldiers raised the Polish national flag over those cities. I stress this fact because we Soviet soldiers have good remembrances of the Polish tankmen.

With the fall of Danzig the enemy lost a large naval base, where submarine crews had been trained. W. Churchill described the importance of that success for the Allies in the following manner: "...the capture of Danzig and the subsequent elimination of one of three main submarine bases is a new factor making things much easier for the Department of Navy (Great Britain--Editor). The renewal of operations by German submarines on the scale which they predicted is now clearly impossible...."⁷

Forces of the 1st Belorussian Front turned toward the northwest and rushed toward the Bay of Pomerania. On 20 March they liberated the coast in their zone from the enemy and reached the lower Oder, eliminating the last Hitlerite bridgehead on its right bank.

Aircraft of the 4th and 16th Air Armies (commanded respectively by Colonel Generals of Aviation K.A. Vershinin and S.I. Rudenko) contributed to the success of the offensive by the ground forces. They carried out continuous strikes against the enemy's defenses, forts and bastions of naval fortresses, and against enemy ships attempting to approach the ports.

During the offensive in East Pomerania, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet blockaded the Danzig enemy grouping, which was pinned against the coast, with aircraft, torpedo boats and submarines. Furthermore, the fleet's air forces had the main role in the battle against ships evacuating fascist troops and delivered strikes against forces and military installations on the coast.

The East Pomeranian Offensive Operation was concluded with the liberation of Danzig and Gdynia. The remaining forces of the Hitlerite 2nd Army, pressed to the coast north of Gdynia, were completely routed on 4 April, and enemy units blockaded on Hel Peninsula and in the area of the Vistula delta northeast of Danzig, capitulated on 9 May 1945.

A large enemy grouping had ceased to be as a result of the successful offensive carried out by our forces in East Pomerania. More than 21 divisions and eight brigades were routed, of which six divisions and three brigades were destroyed.⁸ The Hitlerites had not only suffered large losses, but had been deprived of a strategic bridgehead. The arrival of Soviet forces on the Baltic coast made it possible to improve the basic situation for the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and to implement more effectively the naval and air blockade of enemy groupings pressed against the sea in Kurland, East Prussia, in the area of the Vistula delta and on Hel Peninsula.

The routing of the East Pomeranian grouping and the arrival of Soviet troops on the Baltic Sea coast frustrated the German fascist command's plans for carrying out a flank attack against our groupings operating on the Berlin axis. Furthermore, Headquarters, Supreme High Command, was able to transfer 11 of the freed armies, including two tank armies of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Front, to conduct the Berlin Operation.

The East Pomeranian Operation was distinguished by the art demonstrated in preparing for it within limited time periods and without operational pauses in the combat operations of the fronts. This was achieved as a result of precise troop control, which made it possible to rapidly execute large regroupings of troops and equipment, to put together powerful assault groupings on the main axis and to provide the troops with materiel in good time.

The correct choice of axes for the main thrusts and precise organization of interaction among the fronts, armies and branches of troops contributed to the rapid defeat of the enemy's grouping. Commanders at all levels and their staffs demonstrated improved operational skill. Another feature of the operation was the fact that after successfully penetrating the main zone of the Hitlerite defense, the front assault groupings rapidly developed the offensive on diverging axes. This made it possible to defeat the East Pomeranian Operation grouping piecemeal. The continuous combat operations conducted by the Soviet forces gave the fascist command no breathing space for building up and regrouping reserves.

Tank armies and individual tank and mechanized corps were the assault force of the fronts' attacking groupings. The experience acquired by the command element and staffs of the combined-arms and tank field forces and formations while breaking through a deeply echeloned defense and conducting combat operations in a situation of extremely rugged terrain covered with forests and lakes, and bad roads caused by the spring thaw are especially valuable in this respect.

In the East Pomeranian Operation, the field artillery of the fronts had to perform the unaccustomed mission of combatting enemy naval forces. Anti-ship artillery groups were created for this purpose in the armies engaged in combat operations on the Baltic Sea coast. Their fire was extremely effective. Anti-ship groups of the 19th and 70th Armies sank one combat ship, seven transport ships with a displacement of 8,000-10,000 tons each, 11 motor gunboats and self-propelled barges, and damaged two combat ships, six transports and motor gunboats during the 8 days, for example.⁹

It would be difficult to overstate the military-political results of the East Pomeranian Operation. It was brilliantly conducted at a time when fascist Germany's leaders were actively seeking ways to conclude a separate peace treaty with the USA and England and was attempting to gain time to build up its personnel and equipment to continue the war with the Soviet Union. The liberation of ancient Polish land on the Baltic Sea coast and the routing of the Vistula Army Group created conditions conducive to a decisive offensive by Soviet forces on the main, Berlin, axis.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol. 2, 1976, p 377.
2. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol. 10, 1979, p 141.
3. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], fund 233, inventory 2307, file 193, sheets 19-21.
4. "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Soviet Artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960, p 647.
5. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya..." op. cit., Vol 2, p 378.
6. K.K. Rokossovskiy, "Soldatskiy dolg," [The Soldier's Duty], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, p 330.
7. "Istoriya..." op. cit., pp 147, 148.
8. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 2, p 378.
9. "Sovetskaya artilleriya..." op. cit., p 651.

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MILITARY HISTORY

ARMY GEN LASHCHENKO ON TECHNIQUE OF ENCIRCLING LARGE GROUPS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian, No 2, Feb 85 (Signed to press 24 Jan 85) pp 21-31

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Army Gen P. Lashchenko: "Improving Techniques for Encircling and Destroying Large Enemy Groupings on the Basis of Experience from the Great Patriotic War"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War enriched the theory and praxis of military affairs with the experience of preparing for and conducting offensive operations during which large enemy groupings were encircled and destroyed. Many of those operations became classic models and constituted convincing proof of the superiority of Soviet military art over that of the German fascist army.

Questions pertaining to the encirclement and destruction of enemy groupings have been discussed in our military literature and the periodical press. The purpose of this article is therefore one of reviewing the development of techniques for encircling and destroying large enemy groupings, using the experience from the more instructive operations of the Great Patriotic War.

Techniques for Encircling Enemy Groupings

In the course of conducting offensive operations in the last war, Soviet forces employed diverse techniques for encircling large enemy groupings. The selection of a specific technique was determined by a number of factors, with primary importance attached to the command element's plans for conducting the combat operations, the available quantity of personnel and equipment, the availability of formations of mobile troops, the enemy's grouping and the nature of enemy operations, and the configuration of the front (see table).

An analysis of a number of operations has shown that the encirclement was most frequently effected by /making two powerful thrusts on converging axes against the flanks of the defending enemy grouping/. This technique was successfully used in the Stalingrad Korsun-Shevchenkovo, Vitebsk-Orsha, Bobruysk, Lvov-Sandomierz, Iasi-Kishinev and Berlin operations. It was the most effective in the specific circumstances. The envelopment from both sides permitted the attacking forces to reach the rear areas of the defending enemy forces, to isolate them from reserves being brought up from the depth and prevent them from withdrawing to occupy a defense on advantageous intermediate lines.

Table. Certain Data Describing Operations for Encircling and Destroying German Fascist Forces*

Operations and their dates	Number of fronts involved	Average pace of offensive, km/day	Day of operation encirclement achieved	Number of encircled troops
Stalingrad, 19 Nov 42-3 Feb 43	3	12-15	5th	22 divisions and a number of separate units
Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh, 13-27 Jan 43	1	up to 14	6th	13 divisions
Voronezh-Kastornoye, 24 Jan-2 Feb 43	2	17-19	5th	9 divisions
Korsun-Shevchenkovo, 24 Jan-17 Feb 44	2	10-15	4th	10 divisions and 1 brigade
Minsk, 29 Jun-4 Jul 44	4	19-23	11th	20 diverse formations
Lvov-Sandomierz 13 Jul-29 Aug 44	1	13-15	6th	8 divisions
Iasi-Kishinev, 20-29 Aug 44	2	30-32	5th	18 divisions
Budapest, 29 Oct 44-13 Feb 45	2	4-5	59th	20 diverse formations
East Prussian 13 Jan-25 Apr 45	2	10-14	14th	Around 32 divisions
Prague, 6-11 May 45	3	27-33	4th	More than 50 divisions

*See "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol 6, p 37; "Voyennoye isskustvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne Military Art in World War II, Moscow, Moscow, General Staff Military Academy Publishers, 1973, pp 225-227; "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otchestvennoy boyne 1941-1945" Operations of Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, Vol 2, pp 121, 128-129; Vol 3, 1958, pp 114-115, 345.

In the Stalingrad Operation, for example, the enemy's tactical defense zone was penetrated on the first day with two powerful concentric thrusts, and mobile forces of the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts were introduced into the breaches. They developed the offensive at a rapid pace and on the fifth day, completed the encirclement of an enemy grouping with a total strength of 330,000 men (Diagram 1).

The Korsun-Shevchenkovo Operation is of great interest with respect to the development of encirclement techniques. Rapidly developing the offensive toward each other, the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 6th Tank Army closed the ring around the enemy grouping near Zvenigorodka on the 3rd day and simultaneously created an outer perimeter of encirclement. Their success was consolidated rapidly and securely by combined-arms armies and aviation (Diagram 2).

The Iasi-Kishinev Operation was an instructive model of the rapid encirclement and routing of a large enemy grouping in a mountainous, forested theater of military operations with a large number of developed fortified areas. During that operation forces of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts made two powerful thrusts while 200 kilometers from each other and developed a swift offensive on converging axes. Part of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was simultaneously cutting off the enemy grouping and pressing it against the Black Sea. Most of the forces (60 percent) were directed against the outer perimeter, which made it possible to take effective advantage of the breach for developing the operation at a rapid pace. A significant portion of the rifle troops were used for establishing the inner perimeter and destroying the encircled enemy grouping in the area of Kishinev.

Unlike the Stalingrad and Korsun-Shevchenkovo operations, in which powerful enemy counterthrusts were repelled on the outer perimeter, in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation the enemy thrusts were repelled on the inner perimeter of encirclement. This was due to the fact that the enemy did not have extensive operational reserves, and powerful groupings of our forces were operating aggressively on the outer perimeter.

/Executing one powerful thrust with subsequent envelopment of the groupings, pressing them against the sea and cutting them off from the main forces operating on that axis/ was another technique for encircling large enemy groupings. The technique used in the Baltic Offensive Operation was the most graphic example of this. The enemy's Army Group North was cut off with a powerful frontal thrust against its southern flank toward Shyaulyay and Memel. This axis brought forces of the 1st Baltic Front to the sea by the shortest possible route, rapidly isolated the opposing enemy grouping and cut off its forces withdrawing to the Kurland Peninsula.

/The execution of several frontal thrusts, which broke up the opposing enemy forces to make it possible to route the flank groupings in the tactical defense zone, in order to rapidly bring mobile groups into the operational depth, to the flanks and the rear area of the main enemy forces and then surround them/ was a further development of encirclement techniques.

Our forces acquired their first experience in encircling the enemy in the operational depth in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation. The splitting up of the enemy defense with a powerful thrust in the direction of Chertkovo, combined with the determined maneuvering of the tank armies, led to the encirclement of the enemy's 1st Tank Army 150 kilometers from the forward edge in the area of Kamenets-Podolsk. That army had around 23 divisions, including 10 tank divisions.¹ Because of the inadequate forces and the small number of tanks of the 1st Ukrainian Front's attacking

troops, as well as the great length of the lines of communication, they did not succeed in creating a solid inner perimeter of encirclement or in rapidly splitting up and destroying the enemy grouping. Suffering extensive losses, it succeeded in breaking through to the west along the northern bank of the Dnestr and linking up with forces executing a counterthrust from an area northeast of Lvov.

Advance planning of the encirclement and destruction of three large enemy groupings at various depths in the Belorussian Operation was something new in the development of Soviet military art. The flank (Vitebsk and Bobruysk) groupings of German fascist forces were first encircled and destroyed in the tactical and immediate operational depth. This created the conditions necessary for the development of an offensive by the fronts on converging axes toward Minsk for purposes of encircling and destroying the main forces of Army Group Center 200 kilometers from the starting position of the front forces.

The fact that an insignificant portion of the troops were assigned to accomplish this mission was a specific feature of the conditions under which the Minsk enemy grouping was encircled. This was because forces of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts continued to swiftly develop the offensive into the depth.

The next encirclement of the enemy in the operational depth took place in the Vistula-Oder Operation. In that operation our forces encircled and destroyed large enemy groupings in the areas of Schneidemuhl, Poznan, Breslau and Kustrin.

The experience of encircling a large grouping of German fascist forces in the concluding phase of the Berlin Operation is unquestionably of importance. The plan called for the execution of a number of powerful thrusts on a broad front, encirclement, the simultaneous dismemberment of the Berlin grouping and destruction of each of the parts individually.

A solid front of encirclement had been created around the enemy grouping in Berlin by the end of the day on 25 April. Our forces had encircled the Frankfurt-Guben grouping simultaneously with the Berlin grouping. When the encirclement of those groupings was completed, a solid outer perimeter had been created. It was 25-30 kilometers from the encircled forces in the area of Berlin on 25 April, and 40-80 kilometers southwest and west of there.² The encirclement and dismemberment of the hostile forces concentrated on the Berlin sector and the establishment of an outer perimeter of encirclement had a beneficial effect on the future course of the operation and significantly accelerated Berlin's fall. During the crucial period of the fighting for Berlin, it was impossible to assist the garrison there either from the southeast, from the Frankfurt, Guben grouping, or from the west, where the German 12th Army, which had been transferred from the western front, had switched to an offensive against the Soviet forces. During the encirclement of large enemy groupings, the thrusts were ordinarily made against the more vulnerable spots in their operational formation, on axes through which the forces were introduced into the rear area of the groupings being encircled as rapidly as possible and by the shortest possible routes. This did not rule out the possibility of carrying out the main thrusts against powerful sectors of the enemy defense in a number of operations, however. This was done in the Berlin Operation, for example.

When thrusts were carried out on converging axes in most of the operations we are discussing, the main forces of the front field forces were operating on those axes.




Diagram 1. The Encirclement and Destruction of German Fascist Forces at Stalingrad

Key:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Army Group B, 4th Military Flotilla | 26. Sirotinskaya |
| 2. Voronezh Front | 27. Vertyachi |
| 3. Don Front | 28. And formations of the 4th Tank Army |
| 4. Rossosh | 29. Volga |
| 5. Don | 30. Stalingrad |
| 6. Verkhniy Mamon | 31. Stalingrad Front |
| 7. Boguchar | 32. Millerovo |
| 8. Kantemirovka | 33. Voroshilovograd |
| 9. Koper | 34. Severnyy Donets |
| 10. Southwestern Front | 35. Morozovsk |
| 11. Bolshaya Rossoshka | 36. Tatsinskaya |
| 12. Borodkin | 37. Chir |
| 13. And formations of 4th Tank Army | 38. Kalach-na-Donu |
| 14. Gorodishche | 39. Sovetskiy |
| 15. Gumrak | 40. Nizhne-Chirskaya |
| 16. Krasnyy Oktyabr' Settlement | 41. Nizhne-Kumskiy |
| 17. Mamayev Hill | 42. Verkhniy-Kumskiy |
| 18. Stalingrad | 43. Verkhnyaya Kumoyarskaya |
| 19. Kuporosnoye | 44. Aksay-Yesaulovskiy |
| 20. Beketovka | 45. Aksay |
| 21. Vorolonovo | 46. Kotelnikovskiy |
| 22. Popov | 47. Location of troops |
| 23. Karpovka | 48. Regroupings and counterattacks of German fascist forces |
| 24. Veshenskaya | 49. By |
| 25. Serafimovich | 50. As of |

The forces of adjacent wings of those fronts (in the Korsun-Shevchenkovo and Iasi-Kishinev operations) or the third front (in the Stalingrad and Belorussian operations) were engaged in combat operations in the gaps between the sectors on which the main thrusts were being made. Combined-arms armies reinforced with separate mobile formations were ordinarily also conducting offensive operations involving the encirclement of individual enemy units and formations.

In a number of operations the front assigned only part of the forces to encircle the enemy grouping, focusing the main effort on developing the offensive into the depth. In the Belorussian Operation, for example, the encirclement of the Vitebsk enemy grouping was accomplished in the immediate operational depth by forces of the 1st Baltic Front's 43rd Army and the 3rd Belorussian Front's 39th Army. The main forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front continued to develop the offensive into the depth.

The main phase of the encirclement ordinarily involved a breakthrough of the enemy's defense on several sectors. Combined-arms formations had the main role. Mobile groups of armies and fronts were then introduced into the breach. With air support, they rapidly swept into the enemy's defensive depth, were the first to close the ring of encirclement and after turning the inner perimeter of encirclement over to rifle formations and field forces, they developed a swift offensive on the outer perimeter. They entered into battle with the enemy's reserves and especially with the garrisons at centers of population, only when this was essential to the success of the encirclement maneuver. Combined-arms formations advanced behind the mobile groups and consolidated the battle orders round the encircled grouping, thereby making it difficult or impossible for the grouping to attempt to break out of the encirclement.

We also continued /to perfect the techniques for establishing the inner perimeter of encirclement./

In order to cut the encircled enemy off from its main forces, Soviet forces attempted to establish an inner perimeter of encirclement at a distance which ruled out the possibility of tactical interaction between the encircled grouping and forces outside the encirclement.

A determined offensive into the depth was typical of the combat operations carried out on the outer perimeter of encirclement in most of the operations. It was executed to make it impossible for the enemy to relieve its encircled forces, as well as to repel from the march counterthrusts undertaken by the enemy and to destroy arriving enemy reserves piecemeal. This method was successfully employed in the Stalingrad, Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh, Lvov-Sandomierz and other operations. In some of them the offensive was combined with defensive operations to achieve greater stability of the outer perimeter. The switch to a temporary defense ordinarily had the mission of routing a large enemy tank grouping making a counterthrust to relieve its encircled troops.

The development of large tank engagements was also a specific feature of the battle on the outer perimeter of encirclement. The Korsun-Shevchenkovo Operation is extremely instructive in this respect. The 5th and 6th Guards Tank Armies were used to establish the outer perimeter of encirclement in that operation. Immediately after the encirclement had been completed, they executed a maneuver

to the outer perimeter. Reinforced with rifle troops and artillery, they repelled powerful counterthrusts by eight enemy tank divisions and six infantry divisions, first with their own forces and then jointly with the 2nd Tank Army, when it arrived.

A mobile outer perimeter of encirclement was ordinarily established in operations conducted during the concluding period of the war--in the Belorussian, Yasi-Kishinev and Berlin operations, for example--that is, the forces operating on it engaged in active offensive operations. Their rapid advance into the enemy's defensive depth reliably cut off the encircled groupings and assured their rapid elimination. On 4 July, for example, before a solid inner perimeter of encirclement had been created, the ring round the enemy's Minsk grouping continued to be tightened, and Soviet forces operating on the outer perimeter were already 50 miles west of Minsk. In this situation, even individual groupings which managed to break out of encirclement could not avoid being totally destroyed.

Techniques for Destroying Enemy Groupings

The destruction of encircled groupings in offensive operations of the past war was achieved with determined combat operations by various branches of troops and services of the Armed Forces, which were aimed at destroying personnel and combat equipment of isolated enemy forces and at suppressing their will to continue resisting.

The elimination of encircled enemy groupings during the war was accomplished in diverse operational situations. In those cases in which the German fascist command had the necessary reserves at its disposal, the encircled grouping was ordinarily destroyed in a situation of powerful counterthrusts on the outer perimeter with the objective of relieving the encircled forces (the Stalingrad, Korsun-Shevchenkovo and Budapest operations). By the time the groupings had been encircled in a number of operations, the Wehrmacht command did not have the necessary forces to carry out thrusts against the forces operating on the outer perimeter (the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh, Minsk, Iasi-Kishinev and other operations). In all case, however, operations to route the encircled groupings were begun while they were still being encircled.

When it became necessary to group forces on the outer and inner perimeters of encirclement during the war, combat operations to destroy the encircled enemy forces were drawn-out, and it became necessary to effect extensive regroupings and to commit front reserves to the engagement. Offensive and defensive actions in those operations were combined and were carried out in an extremely complex situation. In those cases in which the enemy had a limited number of operational reserves, the operations conducted by Soviet forces were swift and the encircled enemy was rapidly destroyed. In the Stalingrad Operation, for example, the elimination of the encircled grouping began on 24 November--that is, immediately after it was encircled. Due to stiff resistance by the German fascist forces and to a certain lack of coordination of action by the Stalingrad and Don Fronts, perceptible results were not achieved toward accomplishing this mission. The fronts made another attempt to split up and destroy the encircled grouping in the first part of December at the decision of Headquarters, Supreme High Command. Once again, however, they were unable to achieve the assigned objective. The German fascist command had created a large grouping on the outer perimeter, and on 12 December an offensive was undertaken from the area of Kotel'nikov to relieve the encircled

enemy forces. Not until the enemy grouping attempting to relieve the blockade had been routed did our forces launch determined operations to split up and destroy formations of the German 6th Army.

If a large encircled enemy grouping retained its fighting efficiency and succeeded in setting up a strong defense, as was the case when Soviet forces conducted the Stalingrad Operation, attempts to eliminate it with separate, uncoordinated strikes did not bring success. Such groupings could only be destroyed as a result of thoroughly conceived and well organized offensive operations. Great density of the combat formations was a typical feature of those operations, and the main method of conducting them was that of splitting the enemy groupings up into isolated groups and then destroying them.

In the Korsun-Shevchenkovo Operation as well, destruction of the encircled grouping was begun immediately after the encirclement had been completed. As forces of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts were repelling powerful enemy counterthrusts on the outer perimeter, the encircled grouping was already being eliminated. This was done by making powerful encounter thrusts against the flanks, while simultaneously cutting off the forces taken from sectors not under attack.

The enemy grouping encircled east of Minsk was eliminated by splitting it up into isolated groups, which were then destroyed separately while the offensive was being developed into the depth. The 33rd Army, which was attacking south of the Moscow-Minsk Highway, blocked the enemy's route of withdrawal to the northwest with its right flank and constricted enemy forces in the area of Volma and Pskalin with its center. Developing the offensive south of Minsk, the 49th and 50th Armies used part of their forces to thwart an attempt by the Hitlerites to break through to the south and southwest. On 7 July one of the enemy groups succeeded in breaking through the inner perimeter of encirclement. It was halted the next day, however, by forces of the 50th Army and was subsequently eliminated (Diagram 3).

Various techniques were used for destroying encircled enemy groupings in the Berlin Operation. The enemy grouping operating in the area of Frankfurt-am-Oder and Guben was attempting to break out of encirclement, withdraw in a westerly direction and surrender to the Anglo-American forces. On 26 April enemy formations made a powerful attack on the boundary between the 3rd Guards Army and the 28th Army. They succeeded in advancing some distance, but the enemy grouping which had broken through was routed with an attack by the 25th Tank Corps and three rifle divisions.

On 29 April a large enemy grouping undertook a new and desperate attempt to break out of encirclement. After determined battle, it succeeded in advancing 30 kilometers to the west, where it was halted.⁴ The next day the enemy managed to advance another 10 kilometers, but this was the final spurt. On 1 May the encircled Frankfurt-Guben grouping of Hitlerites was eliminated once and for all. A total of 120,000 prisoners were taken, and more than 300 tanks and assault guns and more than 1500 field guns were captured as a result. The main method used for destroying the enemy groupings was to "envelop" them with available forces and reserves brought in from other sectors and then to split them up and destroy them piecemeal.




Diagram 2. Encirclement and Destruction of Korsun-Shevchenkovo Enemy Grouping

- Key:
- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. 1st Ukrainian Front | 11. Shpola |
| 2. Assault grouping | 12. Viking tank division |
| 3. Rifle divisions | 13. Infantry division |
| 4. Tank corps | 14. Zvenigorodka |
| 5. Mechanized corps | 15. Tank division |
| 6. Kanev | 16. Army group |
| 7. Korsun-Shevchenkovo | 17. Kirovograd |
| 8. Dnepr | 18. Location of troops |
| 9. 2nd Ukrainian Front | 19. At end of |
| 10. 4th Guards Army | 20. Counterthrusts by enemy forces |




Diagram 3. The Elimination of an Encircled Grouping of German Fascist Forces Near Minsk

Key:

- | | |
|---|--------------------|
| 1. 2nd Guards Motorized Regiment | 7. Mitkovshchina |
| 2. Separate machine gun artillery battalion | 8. Minsk |
| 3. Fortified area | 9. Ptich |
| 4. To Moscow | 10. Units |
| 5. Trubchino | 11. Rifle corps |
| 6. Partisan detachment | 12. Rifle division |

The encircled Berlin grouping of German fascist forces was eliminated in a totally different way. Fierce street fighting was underway in the city, which had been prepared by the enemy for a defense. The fascist troops did not attempt to break out of encirclement. Soviet forces focused the effort on individual axes and split up the enemy's defense. By the end of April the opposing enemy grouping had been split up into three groups located in the eastern, central and western parts of the city. They did not have contact with each other, and this contributed to their rapid destruction.

An analysis thus shows that the main technique used for eliminating an encircled enemy in most of the operations was that of splitting its groupings up into individual isolated parts and then destroying them separately. This was frequently achieved with encounter thrusts on converging axes, which sharply reduced the degree of resistance offered by the encircled forces and brought about their rapid destruction. In a number of operations attacks were made for purposes of separating and destroying units of an enemy's encircled grouping. The rest of its forces were then eliminated. This technique was less effective, however, since a great deal of time was required to destroy the encircled enemy. Furthermore, it complicated the organization of interaction and control significantly.

In the elimination of an encircled enemy grouping a divisive thrust would sometimes be made on one axis, with its subsequent development toward a natural barrier. As a rule it was carried out by a grouping of forces formed during the encirclement operation.

Combat operations to destroy an encircled enemy were carried out at full intensity, constantly, day and night, and were supported with massive artillery fire and concentrated air strikes. Groupings attempting to break out to join up with their forces were destroyed in the process of breaking out, but sometimes outside the area of their initial encirclement. This was true in the Berlin Operation. Powerful artillery fire and air strikes made it impossible for the enemy to maneuver its reserves within the ring of encirclement. The necessary reserves reinforced with antitank weapons and antiaircraft artillery were formed on the sectors where the enemy was most likely to attempt to break out of encirclement.

I should stress the fact that the amount of time spent destroying encircled enemy groupings from the moment their encirclement was completed was constantly reduced. It took 71 days to eliminate the encircled grouping in the Stalingrad Operation, 20 days in the Voronezh-Kastornoye, 14 in the Korsun-Shevchenkovo, 7 in the Minsk, 5 in the Iasi-Kishinev, and 2 days in the Prague Operation.⁶ The fact that the enemy had prepared large cities and fortified areas for defense contributed to the increased amount of time used to destroy the encircled groupings in the Budapest and East Prussian operations.

The purposeful party-political work performed in the forces was highly important to the successful encirclement and destruction of large enemy groupings. It focused on generating in the fightingmen a burst of aggressive spirit and a desire to destroy the enemy. A great deal was done to provide political support for the combat training on the eve of an offensive, and political-indoctrinational work was performed among the replenishments. The operation order from the front (or army) commander was read prior to an offensive, which inspired the officers and fightingmen to accomplish the combat mission. Commanders and political workers relied upon the communists in the party-political work.

It must be said in conclusion that along with the successful encirclement operations, there were also those which were not completed, especially during the winter offensive of the first period of the war. This was mainly caused by the fact that the attacking forces did not have adequate, especially mobile, personnel and equipment at that time and had not yet acquired the necessary combat experience. The Rzhev-Vyazma Operation was not successfully carried out, for example. The failure to encircle the large grouping of fascist forces was due to underestimation of the enemy, which had not yet lost the initiative and had air supremacy, to the commanders' limited possibilities for building up the effort on the axes on which success had been achieved, to a lack of mobile formations (except for cavalry) capable of forestalling the enemy with an operational maneuver in the fronts and armies, to inadequate cover for Soviet forces against enemy air strikes, to the relatively small fire damage inflicted upon the enemy, and to a lack of coordination in the operations of the field forces with operational landing forces.

Despite the differences in techniques used by the fronts for encircling and destroying large enemy groupings, they had the following common features: the existence of powerful assault groupings making it possible to rapidly penetrate the

defense and reach the flanks and rear areas of the encircled forces; the establishment of outer and inner perimeters of encirclement; the execution of determined offensive operations on the outer perimeter for purposes of reliably cutting off the encircled groupings from outside assistance; an attempt to split up and rapidly destroy the encircled forces; and the establishment of a reliable blockade from the air, and from the sea on coastal axes.

The experience acquired in the last war in preparing for and executing offensive operations involving the encirclement and destruction of large enemy groupings has not lost its significance in the contemporary situation.

Mobile troops had an exceptionally important role in the encirclement operations. Operating on the outer perimeter, the mobile groups of fronts and armies frequently repelled counterthrusts, pursued withdrawing forces and frustrated enemy attempts to dig in on defensive lines prepared in advance. In a future war, even greater mobility and determination will be required of them in the course of encircling and routing enemy groupings and developing the offensive on the outer perimeter of encirclement.

The aviation gave the ground forces a great deal of assistance with the encirclement and destruction of enemy groupings. It performed reconnaissance, carried out bomb strikes against the enemy, battled the enemy's aviation and reserves, and helped to destroy enemy groupings which had broken out of encirclement. In the future it could be used for air lifting airborne groups of diverse composition to take part in the establishment of inner and outer perimeters of encirclement, for combatting groupings which break out of encirclement, and so forth.

The encirclement in many cases of large groupings in the enemy's operational depth during offensive operations was a great achievement of Soviet operational art. The enemy was sometimes destroyed not in the area of encirclement, but in the course of cutting off attempts to break out of the ring. This was done by systematically separating and then routing units of enemy forces. In our opinion, this technique for destroying encircled groupings may be used frequently in the future as well, since the likely enemy will very apparently possess mobile forces with a powerful striking and fire capability and will assist encircled formations by air-lifting in large forces.

The creative resolution of questions pertaining to troop control and the precise organization of interaction among two to four fronts contributed to the successful encirclement and routing of large German fascist groupings. Headquarters, Supreme High Command, and the commanders of the field forces had a great role in this. A future war will demand even more centralized and flexible, firm and constant control of the troops from commanders and staffs at all levels, which will be accomplished primarily by automating it.

The modern weapons and combat equipment and the increased mobility of the forces make it possible to rapidly encircle and route enemy groupings of forces more effectively than in the last war. It should also be borne in mind that in the contemporary situation the defending forces have immeasurably greater combat capabilities for holding out against the encircling forces. It will therefore be necessary to simultaneously strike at extremely important targets to the entire depth of the operational formation when encircling an enemy grouping.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 6, 1978, p 580.
2. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Operations by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1959, p 355.
4. "Operatsii..." op. cit., p 361.
5. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 10, 1979, p 338.
6. "Sovetskaya..." op. cit., p 37.

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MILITARY HISTORY

ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY DISTRICTS DURING GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 85 (Signed to press 24 Jan 85) pp 32-39

[Article by Maj Gen V. Yatsenko: "The Activities of Military Districts in the Great Patriotic War"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War was a rigorous test for all the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, one which they passed with honor by devastating the main forces of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan. The military districts made a significant contribution to the routing of the enemy. Their multifaceted activities during the war have still not been properly covered in our literature.

The missions assigned to the military district directorates during that period were extremely diverse: directing the mobilization effort; putting together reserves and dispatching draft subunits into the field army; manning new formations and units; organizing combat training in the reserve and training units; monitoring the training of commanders and political workers at military educational institutions; organizing and directing the work of setting up defense lines and when necessary, combat operations by district forces against the enemy. In addition, they were responsible for the missions involved in combatting airborne landing forces and subversive enemy groups and protecting important national economic and military installations, and performed restoration work and measures aimed at maintaining proper order and organization within the district, and so forth.

/Of all the jobs performed by the directorate of a military district, the completion of troop mobilization was the most complex and involved the greatest responsibility/. Especially great difficulties were caused by the fact that the completion of the mobilization was carried out after the enemy had already begun its aggression.

Due to the enemy's surprise attack, there was a breakdown in the notification of mobilization in the Baltic and Western Special Military Districts and in the western oblasts of the Kiev Special Military District. The mobilization in those districts was conducted administratively.

The performance of the mobilization tasks was made even more difficult by the fact that the staffs of the border military districts and the military commissariates had not completely refined the mobilization plans on the eve of the war and

had not made the adjustments necessitated by the change in the disposition of the troops. The draftees and equipment from the national economy were therefore being sent to the military units at their former locations.

Due to significant damage to the railways and a shortage of rolling stock, not all of the mobilization supplies from other military districts were coming in. Of 939 trains scheduled for delivery to the border military districts, for example, 538 loaded trains had been dispatched as of 22 June 1941, but only 83 had arrived at their destination.²

Forces of the Baltic, Western and Kiev Special military districts did not have their full complement of personnel and equipment as a result. Nor were the officer corps and the staffs completely manned after the mobilization.

The mobilization of personnel had almost been completed in that part of the western border districts which had not been captured during the first days of combat operations.

Mobilization was carried out in a more organized manner in the Leningrad and Odessa Military Districts since enemy pressure was considerably weaker on those axes, and the mobilization work was organized at a higher level. The mobilization was performed especially smoothly in the Leningrad Military District. The mobilization in the Karelo-Finnish Republic had been basically completed by the end of 23 June, for example. This was due to advance preparations by the military district directorates and the military commissariates, as well as by local party and soviet organs, to perform these tasks. The mobilization of the personnel in all of the interior military districts was carried out in an organized manner.

We must also mention the good political-moral state of the draftees and the patriotism of the Soviet people. The military commissariats received hundreds of thousands of requests from civilians volunteering for the front.

By a decree passed by the State Defense Committee on 23 July 1941, the overseeing of the mobilization and control over the formation of reserves and the training of draft replenishments were taken from the General Staff and assigned to the Main Directorate for the Formation and Manning of the Soviet Army (Glavupraform), which was established in August. In the military districts the military councils were charged with complete responsibility for completing the mobilization.

/After completing the first group of mobilization measures, the training of reserves and the creation of new field forces, formations and units became the main job of the military district directorates/. The military district directorates devoted special attention to this task. The field army required not only trained draft replacements, but also trained and cohesive formations.

The new formations had to be put together rapidly. The battle with a powerful enemy, however, demanded good training of the personnel and highly cohesive units. All of this placed great responsibility on the district military councils and staffs with respect to preparing fully capable reserves.

A decree passed by the State Defense Committee on 13 August 1941 defined the main mission of reserve units of the Soviet Army. They were to provide combat training for contingents of draftees, to develop them into battleready draft battalions (or companies) and dispatch them promptly into the field army.

In accordance with that decree, the commanders of the military districts were to issue their own orders establishing the training procedure in the reserve units and the procedure for dispatching the draft subunits. As a rule, the draftees underwent training under a curtailed program in the reserve units and formations. It lasted 1½ to 2 months, 3 months for NCOs. After that the personnel were used for making up draft battalions (or companies). It was absolutely forbidden to remove personnel, weapons or TOE equipment from the reserve units for making up new formations (or units).³

The party Central Committee assigned the obkoms and kraykoms and the central committees of Union republic communist parties the mission of providing the reserve units with daily assistance with manning, administration and billeting and with the outfitting of winter camps.

The following secretaries of party obkoms were sent on temporary detached duty assignments for 2 weeks to reserve units by decree of the State Defense Committee in order to provide the command element with on-the-spot assistance: Leningrad, Gorkiy, Novosibirsk, Tula, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Tambov, Chelyabinsk, Tatarsk, Perm, Saratov, Kursk, Vologdo, Chita and Amur, as well as the secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party (Bolshevik), the secretary of the Krasnodar Kray Committee and the head of the military department of the Voronezh Oblast party committee.

The military district staffs and political organs regularly checked on the combat and political training in the reserve formations and units. Generals and officers in the directorates of military districts systematically monitored the organization of the training.

A serious effort was made to see that the personnel of reserve units were not taken away from the training to perform other tasks.⁴ The regular control over the combat training, assistance and great demandingness on the part of the command elements of military districts made it possible to rapidly train personnel in the formations and units and dispatch them into the field army.

The following example alone demonstrates the great support given the front by the reserve units: the 14th Reserve Rifle Brigade of the Moscow Military District trained and sent to the Northwestern and Central fronts 19 draft battalions and eight companies with a total numerical strength of 19,112 in August of 1941 alone, and another 51 rifle and nine special draft companies in September. The 58th Belevskiy Rifle Regiment went to the front from that reserve brigade in October of 1941, and the 7th Reserve Artillery Regiment in February of 1942. The 14th Reserve Rifle Brigade trained more than 250,000 soldiers and commanders in all for the field army during the 15-month period.

Thanks to the efforts of the command elements of military districts and of local party and soviet organs, not only draft subunits, but also reserve formations and field forces were sent to the front during that difficult time for our homeland--the summer and fall of 1941. They played a significant role in the routing of the German fascist invaders at Moscow and in the thwarting of enemy attempts to capture Leningrad.

The military councils and staffs of the military districts attached great importance to the training of command, political and engineering cadres, of which there

was an acute shortage especially during the first months of the war due to the deployment of a large number of reserve and new formations, as well as to the considerable losses suffered at the front.

A number of steps were taken to rapidly resolve this problem: military educational institutions curtailed their training programs; officers were graduated from the military schools ahead of schedule; there was a significant increase in the number of trainees at the academies and military schools; new military educational institutions were established; and short courses were set up at the academies for individuals with a higher education.

Advanced training courses for officer personnel were set up in the military districts. New machine gun, infantry and other schools, and front and district courses for junior lieutenants were established in 1942.⁵

The formation of new artillery, tank and other formations and units, as well as their training, were ordinarily carried out at specialized training centers (tank, artillery and others). A special center for the formation of Guards mortar units was set up in the Moscow Military District in July 1941, for example. During a brief period of time that training center formed and trained 28 M-13 and M-8 battalions and sent them to the front. The workers of Moscow's enterprises provided invaluable assistance with their arming.⁶

Such training centers set up in the military districts and staffed with highly qualified instructors made it possible to provide the personnel with quality training and to make prompt adjustments in the training programs as experience in conducting combat operations was acquired in the course of the war. Measures aimed at the creation and training of reserves played a large role in the routing of the German fascist invaders in the Great Patriotic War.

The military district directorates were charged with a great deal of responsibility with respect to /forming people's militia units and formations/. By 7 July twelve divisions with a total of around 120,000 members had been formed in Moscow and the oblast, and ten divisions and 14 separate artillery and machine gun battalions numbering more than 135,000 members were formed in Leningrad within a brief period of time.⁷ With the assistance of party organizations those formations were provided with essential weapons, gear and uniforms produced at enterprises of Moscow and Leningrad.

People's militia units began to be formed in all of the military districts.

/Volunteer fighter battalions/ were formed in the military districts. They were mainly designated for combatting airborne landing forces and subversive groups. It was also one of the wartime tasks of the district directorate to arm and train these battalions. They not only performed missions of combatting enemy landing forces and protecting defense installations, but also developed combat skill.

/Osoaviakhim Society for Assistance to the Defense Aviation and Chemical Industry / provided the military districts considerable assistance in the training of reserves. Cadres were trained in 30 military specialities for all services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops at military training centers, in paramilitary camps and in Osoaviakhim groups.

The decree passed by the State Defense Committee on 17 September 1941, which introduced /universal mandatory military training/ for citizens between the ages of 16 and 50 years, was one of the most important documents pertaining to the creation of reserves and their training. The Main Directorate of Universal Military Training (vseovuch) was formed under the People's Defense Commissariat, universal military training departments were set up in the military districts and in oblasts, kray and republic military commissariats, and universal military training instructors were introduced in the rayon and city military commissariats to organize the effort to fulfill this decree.

The military district directorate regularly monitored the training of the population in military affairs. Orders and directives were regularly issued on the basis of the inspections, which described shortcomings in the work and ways to eliminate them. An order issued to the forces of the Moscow Military District on 24 November 1941 on the basis of an inspection of the universal military training in the oblasts, for example, pointed out the inadmissibility of using the instructors for other than their designated purpose, as well as the need to enhance the officer classes for the instructors.⁸

The district military councils devoted special attention to the military /training of students at civilian educational institutions/. Inspection departments were set up in a number of military districts and at republic, kray and oblast military commissariats to monitor the training of students at civilian educational institutions, and instructors were added to the regular staffs of rayon and city military commissariats. These departments were charged with monitoring and inspecting the military training of students at civilian educational institutions and providing assistance with its organization.

Around 9.9 million people received military training in the universal military training system during the war.⁹ Hundreds of thousands of machine gunners, mortar-men, snipers, submachine-gunners, radio operators and drivers were trained. In the training process, special attention was devoted to the tactical training of the individual fightingmen and the section, which made the subsequent work of uniting the subunits considerably easier.

While performing the tasks involved in training reserves, the military district directorates also performed operational missions. In a number of cases the troops and educational institutions of military districts /participated directly in combat operations/, prepared defense lines and destroyed airborne enemy landing groups.

After the German fascist forces reached the area of Smolensk, the front line passed within 300 kilometers of Moscow. In July 1941 the military council of the Moscow Military District issued the order to build the Mozhaysk Defense Line on the basis of a 16 July decision by the State Defense Committee and an 18 July order issued by Headquarters, Supreme High Command. The command element of the military district was faced with a difficult task involving great responsibility--to set up a developed system of defense positions on the distant approaches to Moscow within the shortest possible time, taking skillful advantage of the terrain, and to handle the concentration of reserve armies. A total of ten divisions of the people's militia were used for this purpose by order of Lieutenant General P.A. Artem'yev, commander of the Moscow Military District, and with the consent of the People's Commissar of Defense. A forward detachment made up of cadets from the

Tula Military-Technical Weapons School was sent to the area of Mtsensk by the district commander to cover the Orel sector. The 330th Rifle Division, the 14th Reserve Rifle Brigade, the Tula Military-Technical Weapons School and the Tula Fighter Battalion were simultaneously ordered to set up a defense on the distant approaches to the city from the west and southwest. The district also provided the troops with everything necessary to engage in combat operations. Cadets from the Podolsk Artillery School fought courageously on the Maloyaroslav axis, defending the Ilinskiy Combat Zone. They demonstrated exceptional endurance and courage. The military district commander noted their bold and decisive actions in an order issued on 3 November 1941. The cadets, commanders and political workers who had especially distinguished themselves were recommended for government awards.¹⁰

Formations and units of the military districts took a most active part in the building of defense lines and the repelling of enemy attacks. Due to the increased threat to Moscow, for example, the district military council launched an extensive project to organize the capital's defense. Five defense sectors were established in the city, each of which was prepared and defended by specially designated troops. Sector No. 1 was defended by the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization; Sector No. 2, by the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin; Sector No. 3, by the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze; Sector No. 4, by the Artillery Academy; and Sector No. 5, by the Military Engineering Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev. The academy chiefs set up sector staffs, line subunits were formed with the students, and teams were trained for building obstacles and obstructions by demolition, especially in areas into which airborne landing forces were most likely to be dropped. The procedure for taking action in various situations was especially thoroughly worked out, and interaction was organized among the sectors.¹¹

A similar situation developed in a number of other military districts as well. During the first days of October 1941, the enemy invaded the North Caucasus Military District. The district command element was faced with extraordinarily difficult tasks. It had to work with local state authorities to direct the building of defense lines, evacuate the population, plants and factories, and put together fighter battalions and partisan detachments and groups.

The situation which was developing on the Soviet-German front during the first months of the war required rigid centralization of control and increased efficiency in the management of troops and rear service agencies. Because of this, all authority within the border military districts was concentrated in the hands of the commander of the front operating on the given sector.

A directive issued by the General Staff on 25 July 1941, for example, placed the Kiev Military District with all its supply agencies completely under the jurisdiction of the commander of the Southwest Front.¹² All of its directorates and services were required to carry out orders from the appropriate front chiefs. The Western Military District was placed under the authority of the commander of the Western Front under the same conditions. The Directorate of the Leningrad Military District, reformed in July 1941, was also under the authority of the Northern Front's Authority when it was disbanded (August 1941).

Such centralization of control unquestionably contributed to the mobilization of all personnel and equipment within the district for purposes of routing the enemy.

/Territorial defense/ questions occupied a prominent place in the work of district commanders, staffs and political organs. They included organizing the battle against enemy landing and subversive groups, protecting and defending important state and military installations, repairing damaged military buildings and evacuating the population, industrial enterprises and establishments.

Not just the troops, but the population as well, helped to destroy enemy airborne landing forces and subversive groups. Those operations were worked out and planned in detail, and explained to every military subunit and civilian enterprise. The military district staff coordinated the fight against landing forces. An order issued to the troops of the Moscow Military District on 20 August 1941 stated that when an airborne landing group appeared, it should be destroyed without fail both during the landing and after it had landed, in order to eliminate the possibility of enemy acts of subversion. This mission was assigned to the district forces, NKVD detachments, local self-defense bodies and the armed guard at enterprises.¹³

A combat group was also set up in each oblast within the military district to combat airborne landing forces, and a group chief was appointed by order of the commander. The territory of the oblasts was broken down into combat zones.

For the time an airborne landing group was being destroyed, all units of the Soviet Army and the NKVD, as well as armed detachments located within the sector, were operationally subordinate to the chief of the combat sector.

The chiefs of the combat groups and sectors were in constant contact with local party organs, NKVD units, the militia, and the chiefs of adjacent combat groups and sectors.

The military district commander regularly monitored the state of readiness of the combat groups and sectors to carry out their missions, both personally and through his staff.

People's militia battalions, fighter detachments and Osoaviakhim teams were also enlisted to fight airborne landing forces and subversive groups.

Military subunits, NKVD regiments, local rifle troops and armed workers' detachments were used /for protecting important national economic and military installations/ located within the military districts. Each of these subunits was assigned specific facilities and bore responsibility for protecting them.

The extensive employment of HE and incendiary bombs by the enemy aviation made it necessary /to organize fire-fighting efforts and the restoration of buildings/.

A military buildings restoration service was set up in the military districts. It was ordinarily made up out of the military construction organizations and the billeting units of garrisons. Operationally, they were subordinate to the garrison chief.

A considerable number of enemy aircraft were shot down on the approaches to Moscow and other cities, as well as over the cities themselves, in the process of repelling air raids. The commanders of the military districts sent special detachments to organize the search for and the capture of enemy pilots remaining alive and to

collect the aircraft shot down. They arranged for the aircraft to be guarded until representatives from the district staff arrived.¹⁴

The military district directorates also acquired a certain amount of experience /in using local resources/ for support purposes, mainly for new formations. The fuel stocks of local petroleum products bases of the Main Administration for the Marketing and Transportation of Petroleum and Petroleum Products were used in large quantities during the very first months of the war, and capacities of civilian organizations were used for storing the fuel. The manufacture of various types of ammunition and equipment at plants, factories and other enterprises located within the district was highly important.

All of the tasks assigned the military districts were performed with close contact between the military councils and state authorities.

The transfer to the district military councils of the functions of state authorities in the area of defense and the maintaining of public order and state security did not reduce, but on the contrary, increased the role and responsibility of party and soviet organs. The military councils of the military districts implemented many measures by relying on the appropriate party and soviet organs, whose work was aimed at assuring the fulfillment of decisions of the military district command elements and at mobilizing all personnel and resources for combatting the enemy. A typical example of this is the 13 October 1941 decision adopted by the party aktiv of the Moscow city party organization on the defense of Moscow. "In the face of this increased danger," the document stated, "the party aktiv considers it essential to mobilize the entire Moscow party organization, all communists and Komsomol members, and all of Moscow's workers to repel the German fascist invaders, to protect Moscow and set the stage for a victory."¹⁵ This document defined specific measures for reducing the time required to train the subunits in military affairs and to build defense lines, as well as to set up production of additional weapons and combat equipment, and so forth.

Interacting closely with the military councils of the military districts, party and soviet organs did an enormous amount of work toward the accomplishment of military mobilization assignments, the creation of the people's militia, the training of reserves for the front, and so forth.

And so, the military district directorates performed large and difficult tasks during the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

1. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War there were 16 military districts in the USSR: the Baltic, Western and Kiev Special Military Districts, the Leningrad, Moscow, Odessa, Arkhangelsk, Volga, North Caucasus, Transcaucasus, Central Asian, Ural, Siberia, Transbaykal, Kharkov and Orel Military Districts, and the Far East Front.

The number and composition of the districts was not constant during the war due to the temporary occupation of part of our nation's territory by German fascist forces.

2. "Voyennyye soobshcheniya za 50 let" [Military Reports for 50 Years], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, p 46.
3. TsAMO SSSR Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR , fund MVO, inventory 1193, file 22, sheet 85.
4. Ibid., file 22a, sheet 145.
5. Ibid., fund 131, inventory 113358, file 4, sheet 124.
6. Ibid., fund 135, inventory 276293, file 108, sheet 87.
7. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [A History of World War II, 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1975, p 56.
8. TsAMO, fund MVO, inventory 1193, file 22a, sheet 363.
9. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1976, p 395.
10. TsAMO, fund MVO, inventory 1193, file 22a, sheet 85.
11. Ibid., fund 135, inventory 717170, file 4, sheet 279.
12. Ibid., fund 32, inventory 22149, file 18, sheet 233.
13. Ibid., fund MVO, inventory 1193, file 22a, sheet 171.
14. Ibid., p 133.
15. "Rabota partiynykh organizatsiy v period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 godov. Dokumenty i materialy" [The Work of Party Organizations During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: Documents and Materials], Moscow, Pravda, Vol 1, 1982, p 355.

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MILITARY HISTORY

ORGANIZATION, OPERATION OF ANTI-SUBMARINE DEFENSE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 85 (Signed to press 24 Jan 85) pp 40-47

[Article by Rear Adm (Res) V. Yashin, candidate of naval sciences: "Organizing and Implementing Anti-Submarine Defense (From the Experience of the Great Patriotic War)"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Along with performing numerous difficult missions during the war, the Navy also had to constantly protect ships, auxiliary vessels, naval bases and ports against enemy submarines (PL), as well as to frustrate their attempts to gather intelligence and lay mines. The sum total of these combat operations and measures carried out by the fleets comprised the /anti-submarine defense (PLO)/. The anti-submarine defense included the following: reconnaissance of the submarines' zones of operations, their detection and surveillance, both in the immediate area of our naval bases and at the distant approaches to them from the sea; searching for and destroying enemy submarines; providing immediate anti-submarine security for ships and vessels crossing the sea and at basing sites; special equipment of a naval theater with positioned obstacles (mines, netting and booms) which complicated or totally prevented combat activities by enemy submarines.

The command element of the fleets organized and carried out anti-submarine defense over the entire theater. It considered theoretical principles and the practical conclusions derived from experience, which comprised the basis of guiding documents for the prewar period. It also took into account the specific features of the given theater, existing conditions for the current period, and the availability of personnel and equipment. The fleet commanders made appropriate decisions on this basis, which, in turn, served as the basis for the plans worked out by the staffs for conducting combat operations and taking special anti-submarine defense steps.

/Reconnaissance of the submarines' zones of operations, their detection and surveillance/ were important elements of the anti-submarine defense.

Reconnaissance of zones of operation of enemy submarines, which was a part of the fleet's system of daily combat activities, was performed in all naval theaters. mainly by the aviation. The aircraft flew sorties on the basis of special plans compiled by the fleet staffs and conducted surveillance in designated sectors. The breakdown of various naval areas into sectors depended upon the degree of activity and the scope of the fleet's operations, and on the enemy submarines. The designated sectors were ordinarily inspected once or twice a day, more rarely--three times. The aerial reconnaissance provided seagoing forces engaged in anti-submarine defense with information on the locations of hostile submarines and their courses. The Northern Fleet's 49th Separate Naval Reconnaissance Air Squadron, for example, had this as one of its main missions, especially when the fleet was providing support for operational movements of our troops.¹ When units of the 88th Rifle Division crossed from Arkhangelsk, Mezen, Onega and the Kola Peninsula

to Kem between 10 and 18 August 1941, aircraft of that squadron performed reconnaissance for purposes of detecting submarines and transmitting information on them to the destroyers Sokrushitel'nyy and Groznyy and to other ships interacting with the aviation.

Table 1. The Role of Various Reconnaissance and Surveillance Forces and Means of the Northern Fleet in Detecting Enemy Submarines*

Total detections, number/percentage	Including:					
	Radio techni- cal	Surface ships	Subma- rines	Surveil- lance, com- munication posts	Aviation	Coastal sonar stations
3,848/ 100	3,126/ 81.2	430/ 11.1	121/ 3.2	83/ 2.2	73/ 1.9	15/ 0.4

*Table taken from the book "Istoriya voyenno-morskogo isskustva" [History of Naval Art] by A.M. Gakkel, A.N. Zamchalov and K.V. Penzin, Leningrad, Naval Academy Publishers, 1980, p 52.

In exceptional cases surface ships and submarines were specially enlisted for conducting reconnaissance. They most frequently accomplished it incidentally with the performance of other combat missions. Coastal DF radar stations operated especially productively in the detection of submarines. This is illustrated to a certain degree by the data given in Table 1. It shows that the Northern Fleet's radio-technical means detected enemy submarines most frequently and were therefore considered to be the most reliable elements in the anti-submarine defense system. As a rule, ships operating in accordance with target indication information reported to them, reached the targets promptly and accurately and were successful.

Patrol ships were sent out to ensure favorable operating conditions in the naval theaters and to reinforce the anti-submarine defense. The Northern Fleet posted them in the Kola Bay, Iokanga area, in the northern part of the White Sea and at its entrance at the beginning of the war; near Novaya Zemlya in 1942; in the Kara Sea in 1943-1944. Three or four patrol lines were ordinarily designated near the main base, four or five near Iokanga, and two or three in the White Sea. The situation sometimes required beefing up the surveillance. It was conducted on seven lines in the White Sea in August 1941, for example.³

During the period of intense fighting on the Kesteng sector, when ground units were being transferred from one staging area to another, additional patrol ships were deployed at the entrance to Onega Bay.⁴ Escort vessels, as well as mine sweepers and patrol boats made of modified fishing vessels and boats, were mainly used for patrolling. Their combat capabilities did not fully measure up to the demands made of them by the missions they performed.⁵ There was not always enough even of these to provide for a complete and reliable watch for submarines. Although the total number of patrol lines in the North Sea theater was increased to 27 during the war, only part of them (on the approaches to Kola Bay and in the White Sea) could actually be constantly watched.⁶ The Baltic Fleet's command element also began establishing a patrol system in September 1941. It was performed by OVR [defense of sea or waterways areas] forces, which patrolled several lines in two areas (eastern and western).⁷ The ships were constantly subjected to submarine attacks, shelling from coastal artillery and air raids, but they coped with the mission. The threat to them, especially from enemy aircraft and submarines, which lasted until 1945, urgently required the replacement of the patrol ships with special aircraft. Such aircraft, outfitted with equipment for searching for and detecting submarines, were not available until the end of the war.⁸

The most effective activity of the anti-submarine defense was the /special search for submarines for purposes of destroying or temporarily neutralizing them/. It provided for two methods of using the forces: a search by call on the basis of intelligence obtained in advance; and the checking of a specific area. The latter method was used most extensively.

The organization of a search for submarines carried out by ships of the Northern Fleet on 8 and 9 December 1944 is an example. In accordance with an order from the front commander, a group of ships consisting of the Baku the lead ship, and the destroyers Razumnyy, Gremyashchiy, Zhivuchiy, Derzkiy and Doblestnyy, deployed along the Kola Peninsula from Mys Svyatoy Nos to Kola Bay. The ships were formed into three pairs for conducting the search. They were separated from one another by 10 miles and traveled at a speed of 16 knots. Carrying out the search instructions, the pairs of ships took turns using the radar equipment, while the sonar units were all used continuously. This provided for massive and reliable monitoring of the depths. Submarines were detected and attacked four times during the search. There was a confirmed sinking of one of them by the destroyer Zhivuchiy. The activity of enemy submarines, which until then had been very active along the coast at Murmansk, fell off markedly. This reaction by the enemy permitted the conclusion to be made that the use of such a group of destroyers simultaneously in a search had produced results and was the most effective technique for combatting submarines. The persistent pursuit of detected submarines, repeat attacks and skillful maneuvering of the ships were also positive elements in the execution of the combat mission. After detecting a submarine, the destroyer Zhivuchiy (commanded by Captain 3rd Rank N.D. Ryabchenko) opened fire with illuminating shells in order to identify it, for example. When a favorable situation developed, the destroyer rammed the submarine, avoiding two torpedoes launched by the submarine as it approached. Withdrawing 50 meters, the ship opened artillery fire. When the submarine submerged, a series of depth charges were dropped on it. The skillful use of all equipment and available opportunities permitted the destroyer crew to achieve success.

The main method of /protecting lines of communication/ was an escort system, which provided for directing shipping as a whole in the theater and protecting vessels at sea with combat ships. Escort divisions were established in 1942 in the operations departments of the staffs (of the fleet and the White Sea Military Flotilla), for example, in the Northern Fleet for planning the movement of convoys. The anti-submarine defense of ships and vessels at sea and at basing sites was organized and performed in accordance with documents worked out by them (schedules, computations charts and instructions), as well as with existing directives and orders. A convoy commander was appointed in each case, and the commanders of the escort ships and the captains of the vessels were subordinate to him.⁹ Immediately prior to departure, the commander was briefed and fully informed on the situation in the route area. While at sea, he received additional information on changes in the situation and movements of enemy forces, as well as on the passing of friendly ships and vessels in the area.

The anti-submarine defense of convoys was performed only from the forward angles of movement during the first 2½ years of the war. This was due to a shortage of seagoing forces. At the beginning of 1944 all-round security was provided (with rare exceptions). Somewhat later yet, a second security line was formed on the forward angles of movement for escorting especially valuable convoys. The depth

of the anti-submarine defense was increased by using aircraft to search for submarines on the convoy's route at a distance of 25-50 cables. Assault groups (two or three ships from the escort force) were formed for combatting submarines detected near the convoys. They frequently attacked targets in close tactical interaction with aircraft specially detailed for anti-submarine defense.

The large scale of the hauls made by the Northern Fleet on several routes after the war began required a large quantity of personnel and equipment to protect the naval lines of communication. They were mainly used for systematic fleet operations (for the fleet's daily combat activities during the Great Patriotic War). The scope and the importance of certain hauls, as well as the specific features of the situation, made it necessary in individual cases to conduct operations for protecting naval lines of communication. The defense of all external convoys within the boundaries of the Northern Fleet's operational zone was carried out in this manner, for example. Along with other measures, it called for an intensive search for enemy submarines in the areas of Kola Bay and the entrance to the White Sea. Such a search ordinarily preceded the arrival of every Union convoy at Soviet ports and their departure on the return trip. A search for submarines was also conducted along a convoy's immediate route to a distance of 80-120 miles from Kola Bay. Beginning in February 1942, the crews security for transports was beefed up with one to three destroyers at a distance of around 200 miles from there.¹⁰

The scope of the convoy protection is illustrated by the operation conducted by the Northern Fleet between 26 May and 2 June 1942, while escorting the Union PQ-16 convoy.¹¹ It was carried out in a situation of great enemy activity, which in addition to other forces, had deployed up to six submarines at sea. Since the convoy security in the British zone had been organized without adequate consideration and was not reliable, the enemy succeeded in sinking seven transports there.¹² In the operation carried out by the Northern Fleet, it used 67 diverse combat ships and more than 250 aircraft as convoy security in its zone.¹³ As the convoy approached its destination, seaplanes of the Northern Fleet looked for enemy submarines on the approaches to Kola Bay (eight MBR-2 sorties) and along the convoy's route.¹⁴ All of this produced good results. There were no losses in the Northern Fleet's zone. The British Admiralty considered the escorting of convoy PQ-16 to be a significant military success.

The Baltic Fleet's command element performed a great deal of work to organize the anti-submarine defense on the Leningrad-Helsinki-Turku-Stockholm external line of communication in October 1944. This was especially essential in the southern part of the Gulf of Bothnia, where good conditions had developed for enemy submarine operations. Existing units and formations were used, and new ones formed for defending the line of communication along the entire northern coast of the bay: a brigade of skerry ships and the 6th Red Banner Division of Small Submarine Hunters on the Aland Islands; the 12th Battalion of Small Hunters at Hanko; and the naval base, whose forces were securing shipping in the Finnish skerries from Hanko to Kotka, on Porkkala-Udd. Navigation security was provided by the Kronstadt Naval Base east of Kotka. An anti-submarine line was set up in Sedra-Kvarken Strait to prevent enemy submarines from entering the Gulf of Bothnia. The aviation systematically searched for submarines. As a result of these and other measures, only one of 160 transports which travelled that line during the period November 1944 to January 1945 was destroyed, and it was blown up by a mine.¹⁵

The fleets also performed operations for defending ships and vessels on our internal lines of communication, when it was necessary to move a large number of transports or valuable vessels (ice breakers, for example) within a short period of time.

The fleets provided security for other shipments by defending areas of communications and with an escort system. The anti-submarine defense steps taken made it possible to cut losses from enemy actions. In 1941, for example, enemy submarines succeeded in sinking only 7.7 percent of the total number of losses on convoys escorted by the Baltic Fleet from the first day of the war to the abandonment of Tallin. Because of the insignificant success achieved by enemy submarines during the first months of the war, they were withdrawn from our lines of communication.¹⁶ During the second half of June 1944, however, the fascist command transferred several submarines (primarily VII-C class boats) to Tallin and Kortka. In July they took up positions near the southeastern approach to Bjorkezunda, on the East Hogland stretch and in Narva Bay. In the second half of July ships of the Baltic Fleet had more than ten combat contacts with them. Finnish submarines were also active in the Gulf of Finland until mid-August.¹⁷ The increased activity of enemy submarines, especially their appearance in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, as well as their use of acoustic torpedoes, was something of a surprise for the Baltic Fleet's anti-submarine defense.¹⁸ Special air squadrons (to search for submarines) and hunter-killer groups were formed to provide reliable anti-submarine defense, and the mobile patrols were beefed up. A great deal of attention began to be given to enhancing the surveillance of enemy submarines and to the organization of closer interaction among the diverse forces in the process. The number of small submarine hunters and patrol boats was greatly increased in the Baltic Fleet. The urgent steps taken to strengthen the anti-submarine defense for the protection of convoys produced good results: two enemy submarines were destroyed, one in December 1944 and one in January 1945.

Even more substantial steps were taken to improve the anti-submarine defense system in the Northern Fleet. It had only 15 small submarine hunters at the beginning of the war, for example, while the number had been increased to 24 by the end of the war. Furthermore, a specially formed brigade had 30 large hunters and 35 patrol boats.²⁰ There were also other formations of anti-submarine ships and anti-submarine air units. A squadron had been set up, for example, whose main mission was that of providing security on naval lines of communication and mainly, combatting submarines.

The escorting system was improved in the process of protecting the lines of communication. It underwent certain changes in its development, with respect to both its general organization and the methods used for performing it. The partial escorting used at the beginning of combat operations was replaced with escorting by stages and this was, in turn, replaced by through escorting.²¹

/Special preparation of the naval theater/ was assigned a significant place in the anti-submarine defense system. To make it difficult for enemy submarines to penetrate into the interior areas of the theater, to naval bases, ports and harbors, anti-submarine barriers were set up. Anti-submarine and anti-torpedo nets were set out in the area of the Northern Fleet's main base (Polyarnyy) in July 1941, and boom-and-netting barriers were set up on the approaches to bases in Kola Bay and at Iokanga.²² It was very difficult to service them because of adverse weather conditions, to be sure. An anti-tank obstacle was set up on the approaches to Kola Bay at the end of the war.

Mine-laying was considered one of the important missions facing the fleets within the anti-submarine defense system. All service ships, down to cruisers, were adapted and prepared for this purpose. Large ships and aircraft were most frequently used for laying defensive mine obstacles. Mines were ordinarily set out secretly, in poor visibility, frequently with diversionary feinting actions and with strict observance of navigational and hydrographic support measures. This is how the mission was performed by the destroyers Gremyashchiy and Gromkiy (Northern Fleet) on 10 September 1941, for example. In accordance with a 22 August 1941 operation order from the fleet commander, they were to place a defensive mine obstacle of one line and in one row--a total of 100 mines--on the approaches to Pummanki Bay. A group of naval air fighters were charged with providing combat support. At the point where the mines were taken on board they were to protect the ships against enemy aircraft by flying on defensive patrol, and in route--with periodic sorties along the route followed by the destroyers. Two flights of bombers were also in a state of readiness in case the Gremyashchiy and Gromkiy were attacked by enemy surface ships. Two destroyers (a cover group) was detailed for the same purpose. Coastal batteries located on the Sredniy Peninsula provided support in the mine-laying area. A separate destroyer division (commanded by Captain 1st Rank V.A. Fokin) was charged with the direct execution of the mission, and the fleet staff arranged for cover. At the designated time the Gremyashchiy and Gromkiy each took 50 mines on board. This took place during the daylight hours, and according to plan, our fighters therefore flew on constant defensive patrol over the receiving site. Before the ships set out to sea, the fleet's aviation conducted thorough aerial reconnaissance of the areas of passage and the mine-laying area, and of nearby enemy bases and air fields. Support measures were also carried out: the bombers, the coastal artillery batteries and the covering group of ships were put into a state of combat readiness.²⁵ For purposes of maintaining secrecy it was forbidden for the ships to use their radios. Due to the thorough preparations and precisely organized interaction among diverse forces, the mission was successfully carried out, without enemy counteraction.

The mine obstacles fulfilled their purpose to a certain degree even when the enemy detected them. It was forced to halt navigation by its ships and vessels in the area of danger until mine sweeping had been carried out. If this required a great deal of time, the enemy was forced to give up navigation in the area of danger altogether.

The experience of the combat operations demonstrated that seagoing hunter-killer groups made up of high-speed ships equipped with radar and sonar with good discriminating capabilities were the most effective forces for combatting enemy submarines. Naval forces were used aggressively within the anti-submarine defense system (especially the defense of areas of communication) and significantly restricted the maneuvering of enemy submarines and made their operations less effective and less safe. The main mission was to detect enemy submarines and reduce their activities. The convoy ships did not engage in lengthy pursuit of submarines. Battles with them most frequently ended in brief attacks, which only damaged the submarines. The capability for destroying enemy submarines with aircraft was also inadequate. Primarily individual aircraft operated within the anti-submarine defense system. They did not have an adequate quantity of weapons, and their sporadic attacks ordinarily did not result in destruction of the submarine.

The same degree of security was not provided for ships and vessels at sea and at basing sites during different periods of the war or in each naval theater. This

was due in great part to the fact that enemy submarines would be most active only at the very height of combat operations between the German fascist and Soviet forces. This occurred first of all (beginning in 1942) in the Northern Fleet's zone of operations, and it permitted the enemy to acquire considerably more experience in organizing and implementing anti-submarine defense than our fleets, including experience in protecting its convoys. The fight on lines of communication became the main element of combat operations at sea. Enemy submarines were fairly passive in the Baltic during the first 3 years of the war. The danger from enemy submarines was less significant in the Black Sea, and the seagoing anti-submarine forces of the Black Sea Fleet were most frequently used not so much for their specific purpose as for supporting landing operations and performing air defense missions. Table 2 contains something of a comparative assessment of the importance of anti-submarine defense in the combat operations of the Northern and Black Sea Fleets. It is apparent from the table that the Northern Fleet lost far more transport and auxiliary vessels to enemy submarines than to the enemy's other forces. These losses were almost the lowest in the Black Sea, however.

Table 2. Losses (percentage) of transports and Auxiliary Vessels in Northern and Black Sea Fleets from Various Branches of Enemy Forces*

Fleet	Branch of Enemy Forces and Type of Weapon				
	Submarines	Aviation	Surface ships	Mines	Coastal artillery
Northern	47,0	29,4	11,8	11,8	---
Black Sea	6,6	48,7	3,3	26,6	14,8

*Table taken from same source as Table 1

The war at sea demonstrated that it is essential to have a special anti-submarine aviation outfitted with high-precision means of technical detection and destruction of submarines for an effective battle against them. The anti-submarine defense system also requires the following in order to function reliably: an adequate quantity of maneuverable shipboard forces with modern anti-submarine weapons and technical means of detection; a combination of periodic and systematic, daily surveillance by hunter-killer groups, anti-submarine patrols, stationary facilities, with positional preparation of the naval theater and assault actions against detected submarines; and substantiated calculation of the quantity of positional anti-submarine facilities, the tactical and technical level of which conformed to the submarines' capability for penetrating into the defended zone undetected and negotiating anti-submarine barriers.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], fund 12, file 6566, sheets 116, 117.
2. Ibid., sheets 9, 10, 116, 117.
3. Ibid., sheets 9, 10.

4. Ibid.
5. The patrol service was directed mainly against submarines, but it also performed the functions of anti-mine observation posts.
6. A.M. Gakkel', A.N. Zamchalov and K.V. Penzin, op. cit., p 53.
7. OVR stands for defense of sea or waterways area (naval district).
8. V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich, "Sovetskoye voyenno-morskoye iskusstvo v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1973, p 390.
9. Veteran commanders of escort ships were appointed commanders of small convoys, while formation commanders and chiefs of staff were appointed commanders of large and especially important convoys.
10. V.I. Achkasov, op. cit., p 338.
11. TsVMA, fund 2, file 1939, sheet 9397; fund 11, file 35481, sheets 221-223; fund 20, file 23323, sheets 500, 501, 505.
12. Ibid., fund 47, file 5207, sheet 8 reverse; fund 112, file 1539, sheets 40, 40 reverse.
13. A.V. Basov, "Flot v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [The Fleet in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1980, p 196.
14. "Boevaya letopis' Voenno-Morskogo Flota 1941-1942" [Combat Chronicle of the Navy, 1941-1942], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983, p 77.
15. "Krasnoznamenny Baltiyskiy flot v zaversayushchiy period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1944-1945" [The Red Banner Baltic Fleet During the Final Period of the Great Patriotic War of 1944-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp 242-243.
16. K. Denits, "Nemetskiye podvodnyye lodki vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [German Submarines in World War II], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965, p 170.
17. J. Meister, "Der Seekrieg in den Osteuropaischen Gewassern 1941-1945" [The Sea War in Eastern European Waters, 1941-1945], Munich, 1957, p 91.
18. TsVMA, fund 9, file 21526, sheet 269; file 33324, sheet 75.
20. A.V. Basov, op. cit., p 241.
21. In the case of partial escorting, immediate security was provided for vessels at sea only on the more dangerous sections of the route. Escorting by shift was performed through intermediate points, with a certain change in the composition of the convoy. In the case of through escorting, the escort forces accompanied transports from the formation point to the point of destination, with reinforcements on the more dangerous sections.

22. TsvMA, fund 11, file 60, sheet 12; file 6196, sheets 79, 80.
23. P.V. Kolesnik and N.F. Noga, "Sbornik takticheskikh primerov deystviy sil VMF po opytu Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [Collection of Tactical Examples of Operations Carried Out by the Naval Forces During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Leningrad, publication of the Naval Academy, 1982, pp 219, 220.
25. A group of torpedo boats was deployed to provide cover instead of the previously planned two destroyers.

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MILITARY HISTORY

MSU V.I. PETROV ON FRUNZE'S MILITARY ART

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 85 (Signed to press 24 Jan 85) pp 53-65

[Article by MSU V.I. Petrov, Commander in Chief of Ground Forces and Deputy USSR Minister of Defense: "An Outstanding Military Leader of the Lenin School"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] On the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of M.V. Frunze

The second of February 1985 will be the 100th anniversary of the birth of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze, prominent figure of our party and the Soviet State, fervent revolutionary, talented student and companion-in-arms of V.I. Lenin, outstanding military leader, creator of the Soviet Armed Forces and highly prominent military theoretician. Almost 60 years ago, when the Central Committee of the RKP (b)

Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) informed our nation's workers of the demise of M.V. Frunze, it stressed the fact that his personal history reflects the history of our party. Frunze's life and work were indeed organically merged with the heroic struggle waged by the working class and the party for the cause of communism. He was renowned as a revolutionary long before the Great October Socialist Revolution, but his talent as a military leader was revealed most brilliantly during the civil war.

It is well known that at the end of World War I, the Entente stepped up its intervention against the Soviet Republic. At the end of November 1918 British and French ships landed forces at Novorossiysk, Odessa and Sevastopol. New formations and units of American, British and Japanese interventionists were put ashore at Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok. Admiral Kolchak, declaring himself to be "the supreme ruler of Russia," established a military dictatorship at Omsk. The nation was inside a fiery ring of fronts. They stretched more than 8,000 kilometers. The imperialists, allied with the internal counter-revolution, were preparing for new, combined campaigns with the objective of wiping out the gains of the October Revolution.

The war demanded the mobilization of all forces and subordination of the people's lives to defense interests. The party moved forth the best military leaders and most talented organizers from its ranks and sent them to the fronts. M.V. Frunze had a special place among them.

Implementing the strategic plans of the Council of Labor and Defense headed by V.I. Lenin, M.V. Frunze worked out and successfully implemented a number of operations remarkable for their concept, the art demonstrated in their execution and the results achieved, deservedly gaining fame as an outstanding military leader who did not know defeat.

M.V. Frunze did not have a military education in the usual sense of the term. He did not study at any military educational institution. When he assumed the position of 4th Army commander, he did not even have adequate practical experience in commanding troops or directing combat operations. The victories gained under his leadership were only natural, however. Selfless revolutionary struggle was the proletarian military leader's "military academy." He advanced to leadership of the army through the rigorous schooling of the bolshevik underground, many years of revolutionary work, czarist prisons and exile.

Fearless revolutionary, tempered in the rigorous struggle against czarism, M.V. Frunze developed in himself all of the qualities essential to an important military chief. Mikhail Vasil'yevich acquired his military knowledge with determined independent work, by studying military affairs. "...From the very first years of his aware political life," A.S. Bubnov recalled, "to the end of it, he poured over books. He knew everything the progressive thinking of mankind had to offer.... He was always able to learn--in the turbulent revolutionary work, in a prison cell, in Siberian exile."¹

M.V. Frunze developed a broad military perspective while still working as a professional revolutionary. He persistently strove to master all forms of armed struggle as a participant in the armed uprising in Moscow in December 1905 and as the organizer and leader of armed detachments in Shuyskiy and Ivanovsky rayons, as well as while leading combat detachments during the October days of 1917. In August 1918, by a decision of the Central Committee, approved by V.I. Lenin, Mikhail Vasil'yevich was appointed military commissar of the Yaroslavl Military District, on whose territory numerous regular Red Army units were formed and a great deal of work was performed to prepare them for combat. The good qualities of a military leader were manifested especially clearly in M.V. Frunze on the civil war fronts. As a true military leader of the new type of army, he matured along with it, grew strong and learned the art of defeating enemies.

M.V. Frunze's natural talents as a military leader played a considerable role in his development. "Nature gave Frunze," wrote G.D. Gay, "an enormous mind, a gigantic will and personal courage combined with rare simplicity which is inherent only in the leaders of the human masses."² M.V. Frunze's outstanding abilities, his vast store of comprehensive knowledge, his thorough understanding of the principles of military art and his mastery of the dialectical method of thinking, as well as his great will power and indomitable energy created the prerequisites for his successful fulfillment of the role of an important military chief.

M.V. Frunze on the Civil War Fronts

M.V. Frunze made skillful use of the laws underlying the party's political strategy as applicable to the circumstances of the armed struggle for the revolution's victory and its strengthening. All of the operations carried out under his leadership on the Eastern, Turkestan and Southern fronts are models of military art, true manifestations of skill in military leadership.

/M.V. Frunze's work on the Eastern front/ thoroughly and convincingly characterize him as a talented military leader who carried out a number of brilliant operations to route the counterrevolutionary forces and interventionists. It was there that his exceptional capabilities as a military organizer and leader, as a real master at directing troops were brilliantly revealed for the first time.

The situation on the Eastern Front was extremely complex by the time M.V. Frunze assumed command of the 4th Army. Formations making up the army were reminiscent of semi-partisan units, poorly disciplined, unstable in most cases and poorly armed in addition. Within a short time M.V. Frunze had performed an enormous amount of organizational and political-indoctrinational work to strength discipline, to turn the semi-partisan formations into regular, solidly cohesive Red Army units and enhance their fighting efficiency. The army had the mission of securing routes leading from the south and southeast to the Volga on the Saratov and Syzran axes. After familiarizing himself with the situation, Mikhail Vasil'yevich decided to accomplish what had been assigned as essentially a passive mission, with active offensive operations. Swift strikes at the flank and rear area, along with the skillful use of a reserve, detailed in advance and consisting of the 25th Rifle Division's First Brigade and a special-purpose detachment, brought success and demonstrated the young army commander's outstanding military leadership abilities.

In order to deal the White Guards a decisive defeat in the area of Uralsk Oblast and establish contact with Turkestan, M.V. Frunze considered it essential to form the Southern Army Group. His proposal received V.I. Lenin's support.

Advancing toward the Volga, General Khanzhin's Western Army threatened to cut off the Southern Group's lines of communication and, with the assistance of the Orenburg and Ural White Cossack Armies, to join forces with Denikin's troops. The plan worked out by M.V. Frunze for the counterthrust was to gather more and more battleworthy formations from the 1st, 4th and Turkestan armies, by weakening the secondary axes, into a single striking force in the area of Buzuluk, deliver a powerful strike at the left flank and rear area of the enemy's main grouping, cut off its routes of withdrawal and complete the routing of Kolchak's main forces. This mission was successfully accomplished by forces of the Southern Group in the course of the successively deeper Buguruslan, Belebey and Ufa operations, which were brilliantly executed under M.V. Frunze's leadership. The execution of those operations was a significant advance in the development of the Red Army's military art, since each subsequent offensive operation in World War I had been conducted following a lengthy pause, necessary for carrying out preparatory measures for the new offensive.

The Buguruslan, Belebey and Ufa operations resulted in the routing of General Khanzhin's assault army, which lost more than 25,000 men; General Kappel's corps was smashed, and General Bakich's corps was destroyed. Kolchak's forces did not recover from that defeat and were forced to retreat to the Ural Mountain range. Forces of the Southern Group battled their way more than 350 kilometers and liberated a vast region between the Volga and the Urals.

During the counteroffensive the combat operations conducted by the Eastern Front's Southern Group went down in the history of the civil war as a model of brilliant maneuvering. "The counterthrust carried out by M.V. Frunze against Kolchak," F.F. Novitskiy, his closest aide, recalled, "was so skillful, and the results were so extensive, that even had there been no subsequent victorious operations on the

Turkestan Front and especially, on the Southern front, M.V. Frunze would still have been assured the fame of a great proletarian military leader."³

The successful operations by the Southern Group made it possible to switch to a determined offensive with forces of the Eastern Front's 2nd and 3rd Armies and to begin a general, strategic offensive over the entire front without any sort of pause in the second half of June.

The party and the government properly appreciated M.V. Frunze's abilities to organize a victory over the enemy. He was appointed commander of the Eastern Front on 13 July. By that time, the armies of its left wing and center had already crossed the Ural Mountain ridge and reached the plains of Siberia. Kolchak threw his last reserves against the front to prevent the Soviet forces from advancing further. The front commander figured out the enemy's plan, which was to defeat the front's 3rd Army with a thrust from an area south of Ishim. By maneuvering rapidly, M.V. Frunze formed an assault group of the 5th Army and eliminated the developing threat.

During the Eastern Front's offensive, the Kolchak grouping of forces was split into two isolated parts, one of which was driven into Siberia, while the second withdrew to the southeast. M.V. Frunze deserves the credit for the successful achievement of this important strategic objective. His military leadership art clearly demonstrated an effort to totally route the enemy by conducting successive offensive operations to a great depth without pauses in operations. The problem of switching from a defense to a determined counter offensive with limited forces in the face of a continuing enemy offensive was brilliantly resolved. With approximately equal forces, M.V. Frunze created a double superiority over the enemy on the axis of the main thrust by skillfully regrouping his forces. The strike against the flank and rear area of the main enemy grouping was carried out at a time when the aggressive strength of the Kolchak forces had begun weakening considerably, available reserves had been committed to the engagement, the front of the offensive had been expanded, and large gaps had developed between the Western Army Corps.

The second important phase of M.V. Frunze's military leadership began in August 1919, when the mission of routing Kolchak's armies had basically been completed. The party placed him /at the head of the Turkestan Front/.

After thoroughly studying the situation, strengthening discipline and order in the units, thoroughly thinking out the techniques for combatting the new enemy, and skillfully combining the armed conflict with political work in the masses, Frunze set about destroying the enemy forces operating in a vast area of Turkestan.

The main concept behind the battle with the Ural White Cossacks was to cut off the enemy from its bases--that is, from the villages and hamlets and other communities--from which they were replenishing their food and forage supplies and driving it into the uninhabited steppe, thereby depriving them of the ability to resist. Although the enemy had more than four times as many horses, M.V. Frunze regrouped to form the Ural and Iletskaya assault groups in the 1st and 4th Armies and assigned them the mission of encircling and destroying the main forces of the Ural White Cossack Army and then developing an offensive against Guryev. The front commander formed special detachments of all branches of troops to pursue the

cossack cavalry, which were capable of maneuvering and executing independent operations, and in the final phase of the liberation of Guryev, he combined the 4th Army's entire cavalry into one cavalry group.

The front forces gained a brilliant victory under M.V. Frunze's command in the Aktyubinsk Operation. They completely surrounded the main forces of the enemy's Southern Army by executing strikes on converging axes. Cut off from its rear services, the army surrendered almost in its entirety. This was a brilliant example of the encirclement and complete routing of a 60,000-man enemy grouping with half the forces. The front of the Kolchak forces was broken up as a result, and the White Cossacks of the Ural Army were cut off from the main forces.

The Ural-Guryev offensive operation was one of the most lengthy (70 days) and deepest (up to 500 kilometers) front operations conducted by Soviet forces during the civil war years. It was conducted in the harsh conditions of winter and in a roadless area. M.V. Frunze regrouped to create powerful assault groupings in the 1st and 4th Armies. The routes of withdrawal for the Iletskiy Corps of White Cossacks were cut off with decisive operations, and its formations capitulated. This operation clearly revealed the great moral qualities and fighting efficiency of the Soviet troops and demonstrated once again M.V. Frunze's outstanding military leadership capabilities.

A large operation to route counterrevolutionary forces of the Emir of Bukhara was conducted under M.V. Frunze's personal direction. That operation is instructive in that although the enemy had four times the forces, M.V. Frunze was able to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to regroup its forces and organize a defense, accomplishing this with decisive operations by front assault groupings attacking from the east, the west and south. Great art was demonstrated in the capture of the fortress.

As a member of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] and a member of the Commission on Turkestan of the RKP(b) Central Committee, M.V. Frunze skillfully combined his leadership of combat operations with state and political activities aimed at strengthening Soviet power in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

One of the most important phases in M.V. Frunze's military leadership was /his direction of the Southern Front forces in the routing of Vrangeli/. His gift for thoroughly analyzing the situation, the forces and the condition of the enemy, and the conditions of the theater of military operations was demonstrated especially brilliantly there.

Halting the offensive against the Donbass, Vrangeli began an invasion of the Right-Bank Ukraine in the areas of Nikopol and Aleksandrovsk on 8 October. M.V. Frunze planned and brilliantly conducted the defensive operation, in the course of which the Southern Front forces halted the offensive by the enemy's 80,000-man army and inflicted enormous losses upon it. Systematic offensive operations were then conducted to liberate Northern Tavria and the Crimean Peninsula.

M.V. Frunze's plan in the operation to liberate Northern Tavria was to eliminate the threat of invasion to the Right-Bank Ukraine and the Donbass by White Armies with concentric thrusts from several directions, to encircle Vrangeli's main forces in the steppe areas north of the Crimean Peninsula and completely destroy them.

The 1st Cavalry Army and the 6th Army cut off the enemy's main forces from the Crimea with a thrust from the Kakhovka bridgehead into its rear area. Forced to acknowledge his situation in Northern Tavria as hopeless, Vrangeli issued the order for a hasty withdrawal. Although the encirclement operation conceived by M.V. Frunze did not result in the destruction of the enemy's main forces, it predetermined their ultimate elimination.

In the Perekop-Chongar operation, the front commander considered it possible to destroy the enemy with one powerful, precisely aimed, combined strike. It was planned to negotiate the enemy's Perekop fortifications by bypassing them through Sivash, and to use part of the forces for an offensive from the front. The Southern Front forces inflicted a devastating defeat upon Vrangeli's army within an exceptionally short time and in extraordinarily difficult conditions. This was one of the most remarkable phases in M.V. Frunze's military activities, one in which his talent as a military leader and his consummate genius were completely revealed.

The operation was instructive in its decisive concentration of forces on the axis of the main thrust and the creation of a vast superiority in forces over the enemy. The execution of a breakthrough of a prepared, deeply echeloned defense was a qualitatively new development in Soviet military art. The problem of developing the tactical success into an operational one was successfully resolved by committing to the battle the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Armies, which were in the front's second echelon. The frontal thrust was skillfully combined with an enveloping maneuver into the flank and rear area of the enemy forces.

Assessing the operations conducted by the Southern Front forces to route the Vrangeli forces in the Crimea, V.I. Lenin stated the following at the 8th All-Russian Congress of Soviets: "That complete, decisive and remarkably rapid victory gained over Vrangeli is one of the most brilliant pages in the history of the Red Army."⁴

With the routing of Vrangeli, the civil war ended in the European part of the nation. Makhno, Petlyura and kulak elements were taking action against the gains of the revolution in the Soviet Ukraine, however. The party Central Committee assigned M.V. Frunze to head the battle against the banditry. Once again, Mikhail Vasil'yevich demonstrated a creative approach to the execution of the assigned mission. He countered the enemy's tactic of unexpected raids and shifting of areas of combat operations with a new technique. By executing swift thrusts with highly mobile "flying detachments," he achieved the rapid encirclement and destruction of the Makhno bands.

Typical Features of M.V. Frunze's Military Leadership Art

An analysis of operations carried out on the civil war fronts in accordance with M.V. Frunze's concepts and under his leadership permits one to conclude that each of them made an invaluable contribution to the shaping and development of Soviet military art. To him goes the credit for organizing and conducting successive offensive operations, creating powerful strike groupings on the main axes of an offensive, executing bold flank thrusts and reaching the rear areas of the opposing enemy's main forces for purposes of encircling and destroying them. He showed us great models of the organization and execution of a breakthrough of a deeply echeloned defense, the forcing of large water barriers, and the storming of a

fortress defended by numerically superior enemy forces. All of the operations conducted under M.V. Frunze's leadership provide vast material for demonstrating the versatility of the outstanding military leader's military talent, the characteristic features of his style of operational leadership and the originality and strict purposefulness of his thinking.

First of all, M.V. Frunze had the ability /to rapidly and correctly assess the situation and foresee its development/. With extremely rare exceptions, his assessment of the developing situation and his forecast of the likely course of military operations were distinguished by incredible depth. During his combat career as commander of an army and then an army group and finally, of a front, Mikhail Vasil'yevich dealt with a great diversity of enemies. He directed operations against the regular armies of Kolchak and Vrangeli, conducted combat operations against irregular White Cossack units, routed the bands of Fergana basmachi and the Makhno band. Each of these enemies employed different techniques for fighting, which had to be understood and assessed and to be countered with appropriate operations in order to achieve victory.

M.V. Frunze's thorough and in-depth study of the situation permitted him to correctly assess the actual status and strength of the opposing enemy. He studied the enemy's weak points as carefully as he studied its strong points. This made it possible to thoroughly see into the enemy's concepts and plans, to guess its intentions, to find the correct way to accomplish the assigned mission, to define the plan for his own actions and to promptly take the necessary steps to ward off enemy thrusts. In preparing the counterthrust against the kolchak forces, for example, M.V. Frunze correctly defined the possible nature of the enemy's operations, the area of concentration of the enemy's assault grouping, the axis of its main thrust and the bases of its interaction almost a month and a half before it began. The correct determination of the axes of a possible attack by Vrangeli on Nikopol from the direction of Aleksandrovsk permitted the front commander to concentrate the 2nd Cavalry Army on the Nikopol axis in advance and to execute a decisive attack against the enemy.

The ability /to thoroughly understand the determining natural factors governing the course of combat operations and to rapidly make a bold decision assuring success/ was one of the most important features of M.V. Frunze's military leadership art. His decisions were always substantiated, clear and purposeful. His willingness to take a risk was always combined with strict deliberation, essential caution, a thorough understanding of the actual situation and the expediency of the plans for the operations. Every one of his operational concepts was based on a precise calculation of the personnel and equipment. The forces were assigned missions which, although demanding the maximum effort from them, never went beyond the boundaries of the possible.

Of the many missions facing the forces, M.V. Frunze selected the main mission in accordance with the situation, on which the main effort had to be focused. Forces of the Eastern Front's Southern Group, for example, had to simultaneously take part in combat operations on three axes: against Khanchin's Army and against the Ural and Orenburg White Cossacks. M.V. Frunze considered the most important of these missions to be that of routing Khanchin's army, since its successful execution would alter the situation on the entire front. The subsequent course of events totally justified his decision.

Exceptional persistence, consistency and firmness in the implementation of his decisions were distinguishing features of M.V. Frunze. If he saw that the situation had changed abruptly, however, he immediately made the necessary adjustments in his decision. This was the case in the forcing of the Belaya River, for example. Because of determined enemy resistance, attempts by the 4th Army's assault group to force the river were unsuccessful. To the north of Ufa, however, the 25th Rifle Division held a bridgehead up to 8 kilometers on the front and 10 kilometers in depth in the area of Krasnyy Yar. The 5th Army's adjacent 26th Division also held a bridgehead. Considering the situation, M.V. Frunze shifted the main thrust to the army's left flank, sent all of the 25th Division across to the bridgehead and committed the 31st Division from his reserve on that axis. On the southern front, as soon as it became clear that an offensive over the tongue of Arabat would involve great difficulties, Frunze found another solution, which, together with the frontal offensive, should make it possible to bypass the powerfully fortified Perekop positions and the main grouping of Vranghel's forces. Mikhail Vasil'yevich would perceive turning points in the situation extraordinarily rapidly and correctly and immediately react to them.

Such qualities as /breadth and boldness of operational concepts and the ability to correctly select the most expedient axis of the main strike for the situation/ draws one's attention in V. Frunze's military leadership. He took into account the total group of political, economic and military factors. Every analysis of a military situation was always combined with a careful assessment of the feelings of all the social strata of the population in the area of combat operations. "It was a fortunate feature of Frunze's nature," wrote A.S. Bubnov, "that he was able to combine the revolutionary fighter with the revolutionary theoretician, politician with military specialist."⁵

In all of the operations conducted under M.V. Frunze's leadership, the main thrust was ordinarily executed against the enemy's weak spot, but always on that axis which brought the assault grouping to the flank and the rear area of the enemy's main forces. M.V. Frunze boldly concentrated personnel and equipment on the axes selected for the thrust and created groupings of forces there which assured successful development of the operations. Mikhail Vasil'yevich's exceptional vigor and determination in the achievement of the assigned objective and his extraordinary endurance permitted him not to relax the effort on the main axis, despite requests for assistance from those sectors which he considered to be secondary. For example, he halted Vranghel's offensive against the Donbass without committing the Right Bank group of forces to the battle, and fought beyond the Dnepr without using the main forces of the 6th Army, which was to play an extremely important role in the general offensive.

All of M.V. Frunze's military leadership was characterized by /a passionate striving to conduct offensive operations with decisive objectives/. At a later date, when he summed up his combat experience, he wrote that "only he who finds within himself the resolve to attack is victorious; the side which only defends is doomed to inevitable defeat."⁶ He derived the following conclusion from this: "...not formal aggressiveness, but initiative and activeness ensuring the successful outcome of an offensive operation must be the main features of a maneuvering strategy...."⁷ and although this principle was formulated by M.V. Frunze after the civil war had ended, it was his main principle throughout his combat career. A constant striving to actively accomplish any mission assigned the forces headed by him, which was

characteristic of M.V. Frunze, stemmed from this. He wrote the following in an order as early as 12 February 1919: "Taking into account the extraordinary importance of ending the bloodshed in Ural'sk Oblast as rapidly as possible and possible ways to prevent the most vital counterrevolutionary nucleus of the Ural forces from evading our attacks, we must immediately engage in the most vigorous action and, disregarding shortages in our materiel supply and the fatigue of the troops, switch to a determined offensive."⁸

His striving to accomplish missions with vigorous, imaginative operations was based on the military leader's firm and unshakeable confidence that the battle would be successful and on his possession of such important qualities as personal courage, boldness, resolve, persistence in the achievement of the intended objective, and a readiness to take a justified risk. In order to carry out his concepts and fully achieve the objectives set, M.V. Frunze took skillful advantage of conflicts in the enemy camp, made efficient use of personnel and equipment in the operations and skillfully built up the effort on selected axes until the main enemy groupings had been completely routed.

In M.V. Frunze's military leadership there was /a constant striving to engage in extensive, mobile operations /and to destroy enemy personnel with a skillful combination of flank and frontal attacks. M.V. Frunze employed flank attacks and encirclement of the enemy groups with his characteristic boldness and grand scale. In a conversation with Eastern Front Chief of Staff P.P. Lebedev, Frunze clearly described once again what he considered to be the main method of action of the Red Army forces: "I am most adamantly against pressing and forcing the enemy back, and I constantly adhere to the concept of deep envelopment, sometimes even when there is a certain risk."⁹ According to M.V. Frunze's concept the operations of Southern Front forces, for example, were not simply to force the Vrangel' forces out of Northern Tavria, but "to prevent the enemy from withdrawing to the Crimea no matter what, to destroy the main forces grouping to the north and the northeast of the isthmuses with coordinated, concentric offensives by all the armies, to cut off their routes of withdrawal to the Crimea and strive to capture the isthmuses on the heels of the fleeing forces."¹⁰

A risk acceptable to M.V. Frunze, which was based on precise calculations and foresight of the possible development of events, always led to victory over the enemy. The combined offensive, for example--a rapid advance by the 3rd Army and its entry into the enemy's rear area on the Southern Ural axis, and frontal pursuit of the 5th Army in cooperation with the Southern Group--led to the total collapse of the operation conceived by the Whites.

Both during the planning and preparations and in the course of the operation, M.V. Frunze always concerned himself with assuring that when the enemy began withdrawing, it was persistently pursued, making active use of the enveloping maneuver on the enemy's route of withdrawal. When the first indications appeared that the enemy was withdrawing from near Buguruslan, for example, M.V. Frunze immediately instructed the assault group to veer to the east and develop vigorous and bold cavalry action, flinging it into an envelopment of the 11th White Division's left flank and the rear area of the entire Buguruslan group of Whites.

M.V. Frunze drew the following conclusion from a summarization of the civil war experience: "...maneuverability must become a vital part of our Red Army."¹¹

This gives rise to an urgent need: "...our command personnel must be indoctrinated primarily with the concepts of maneuvering and mobility, and the entire Red Army must be prepared and trained in the art of executing march maneuvers rapidly and according to plan."¹² This requirement is extraordinarily important in the contemporary situation.

A resolute proponent of maneuvering operations, M.V. Frunze did not regard maneuvering merely as a means of forcing the enemy to withdraw. In his understanding, maneuvering should produce the most appropriate grouping of one's forces for the given situation and place it into the most advantageous position for engaging in combat operations to destroy the enemy. "Maneuvering is not a goal in itself," M.V. Frunze wrote. "It is only one means of achieving the main objective--to gain victory by destroying the enemy's organized armed force and capturing its vitally important bases."¹³

While stressing the advantages of maneuvering operations, M.V. Frunze also pointed out that correct maneuvering is inconceivable without the extensive use of positional forms of combat. "No war, even one involving the greatest degree of maneuverability, can be waged without positional elements. The very support of maneuvering requires the use of positional techniques for the specific situation and for the specific circumstances."¹⁴

M.V. Frunze attached crucial importance to /retaining the initiative/, which makes it possible to dictate ones will to the enemy and to achieve the element of surprise in attacks against the enemy, which is one of the most important guarantees of success. "...The side which holds the initiative," he wrote, "the side which has the element of surprise at its disposal, frequently frustrates the enemy's will, thereby creating more favorable conditions for itself."¹⁵

M.V. Frunze was an ardent opponent of /using routine forms and methods of conducting combat operations, established once and for all/. "The Red commander," he said, "must learn to make full use of that way of thinking, that art of analyzing developments provided by Marxist doctrine. This method essentially means that ...any means and any method may have application in a specific situation. The commander's art is manifested in his ability to select from the diversity of means at his disposal, those which will produce the best results in the specific situation and at the specific time."¹⁶

The breadth and boldness of M.V. Frunze's operational concepts were always combined /with painstaking work to prepare for the combat operations/ and to create conditions making it possible to eliminate the decisions. He thoroughly thought out every operation from the standpoint of all-around support and believed that "at least three-quarters of the job consists of preliminary work, strictly thought out on the basis of absolutely accurate information."¹⁷ Specifically, the success of the counteroffensive against Kolchak was achieved with painstaking work to bring the forces to required strength and to organize their materiel support, and by building up the necessary reserves in advance.

M.V. Frunze attached great importance to the political indoctrination of the personnel and to the strengthening of military discipline and the moral of the forces. He considered the communists to be the main force binding the units and formations together; he constantly showed enormous concern for enhancing the role of party organizations and devoted a great deal of attention to the performance of effective party-political work in the forces.

M.V. Frunze's political leadership was distinguished by extraordinary /flexibility and effectiveness of troop control/. When he issued an order, he would take most vigorous steps to assure that it was executed. Mikhail Vasil'yevich actively directed the armies from his first days as front commander. He personally influenced the course and the outcome of the Chelyabinsk operation by issuing an order to the 3rd Army at a tense moment in its development to assist the 5th Army by having the 21st Rifle Division make a vigorous attack and enter the rear area of the northern group of Kolchak forces.

M.V. Frunze did not limit himself to general operational direction, but would appear on the battlefield at needed times in order to direct and inspire the troops on the spot. M.V. Frunze made his personal visits to the units and to the forward positions after strictly considering the situation, and went where his direct participation would contribute to the achievement of victory. At a critical time in a battle, he would frequently show up in the battle orders of units in the first echelons of the attacking formations. When preparing for the Perekop-Chongar operation, he visited the location of the forward units, personally ascertained that the Sivash could be forded, and designated the sector where the attacking formations would force it.

M.V. Frunze had unquestioned authority among all the personnel. He could find the way to the heart of every fighter and commander. This lifted the morale of the troops up high, strengthened their confidence in their military leader and instilled in them the determination and willingness to carry out his every order.

It should be pointed out in conclusion that all of M.V. Frunze's military leadership on the civil war fronts occurred under V.I. Lenin's immediate supervision. The leader of the revolution was always informed about M.V. Frunze's decisions and would define in more specific terms the objectives of the operations planned by him and provide all-around assistance in their achievement, without interfering in the details.

Implementing the party will, M.V. Frunze made an inestimable contribution to the cause of achieving victory over the interventionists and White Guards during the civil war years, skillfully combining direction of important operations with state and political activity aimed at consolidating Soviet power and the military victories which had been gained. This was typical of him as a mature military leader of the Lenin school. The most typical features of the Red Army--a new type of army--were reflected with enormous completeness, brilliance and great depth in his work.

After the civil war, M.V. Frunze brilliantly demonstrated the talents of a military theoretician, prominent organizer and outstanding leader of the army and navy. At the beginning of December 1920 he was appointed commander of the armed forces of the Ukraine and the Crimea, and was charged with the duties of plenipotentiary of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine. In March 1924 M.V. Frunze became deputy chairman and in January 1925, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. In February he also became a member of the Council of Labor and Defense.

Dialectically applying his extensive experience in military and state work, M.V. Frunze creatively developed the basic Leninist principles in the area of Soviet

military science and made an important contribution to the development of the theory of military art. His vast scientific summarizations provided the foundation for development of the theory of the offensive operation in depth.

M.V. Frunze headed the reorganization of the Red Army, known as the military reform of 1924-1925. All of the steps taken within the framework of that reform had the objective of achieving drastic improvement of the combat capability of the army and navy and further perfecting their training for repelling imperialist aggression. "We can and must," M.V. Frunze said, "turn our Red Army into an invincible force, a force which no one can oppose with anything like it."¹⁸

The control agencies of the army and navy were rapidly reorganized under M.V. Frunze's supervision, the transition was made to the regular-territorial system, national military formations were created, the system of officer training, military training and indoctrination was reorganized, and necessary changes were made in the organizational and TOE structure of the units and formations. Regulations and manuals were thoroughly rewritten, sole command was introduced in the Armed Forces, and the functioning of their rear services was improved. A great deal was done to eliminate the army's lag in the area of technical equipment.

M.V. Frunze's multifaceted military work was greatly appreciated. He was an extremely important worker and was the best leader of our Red Army. With respect to his military expertise and the organization of the military forces, Comrade Frunze had no equal in our Union. Many questions of military theory which he developed out of the civil war experience as applicable to the tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces placed M.V. Frunze in the ranks of outstanding military thinkers and contributed to the active implementation of Lenin's precepts on protecting the socialist homeland. The basic theoretical principles and recommendations provided by him brilliantly passed the test for scientific maturity in the Great Patriotic War. Among other things, the correctness of his assessment of the nature of modern wars, the directions selected for the training and indoctrination of the troops, and his views on the correlation of the main types of combat operations and methods of conducting them were confirmed.

Despite the enormous changes which have occurred over the past 60 years in the composition of the Armed Forces, in their technical equipment and operational and tactical views, many of M.V. Frunze's theoretical military tenets are still important today. They are of enormous methodological and practical value and are helping the military cadres in their practical work of strengthening the combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces. Application of the basic tenets and recommendations worked out by M.V. Frunze are providing inestimable assistance in the organization of the combat training and indoctrination of fightingmen in the army and navy.

In the contemporary situation the Soviet Armed Forces are faced with more difficult missions involving greater responsibility. In the situation of a growing threat of war on the part of the imperialists, our party and the Soviet Government demand that the Armed Forces constantly remain at a high level of readiness to repel aggression by the enemy. Our military doctrine is thoroughly defensive and has the objective of insuring the security of the Soviet State and our allies.

Should there be an attack on our nation and our allies, however, the Armed Forces will take vigorous and determined action in cooperation with the other fraternal

armies. All of this is making increased demands of the training of the troops and naval forces, especially their field, air and naval training. The well-known principle of teaching the forces that which is essential in a war, which was so skillfully implemented by M.V. Frunze, is not only still in force, but is acquiring even greater importance, because it would be considerably more difficult to retrain the troops in the process of a war in the contemporary situation than it was in the past, should the imperialists succeed in unleashing a war. It is therefore demanded that the entire officer corps work tirelessly to enhance the combat training and the political awareness of the fightingmen and to perfect the forms and methods of indoctrinating them. The training and indoctrination of the officer cadres is a particularly important task. They must possess profound knowledge and solid practical skills in directing the troops, skillfully handle the weapons and combat equipment, and possess the good methodological and pedagogical qualities required by indoctrinators of subordinates. Developing a strong will, good organizational abilities and persistence in achieving the objective in the officers is an equally important task.

USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov points out that their (the officers'--V.P.) is a responsible and honored profession. The homeland has entrusted them with its most precious possession--our remarkable youth, whom they must teach military affairs and indoctrinate and when necessary, lead them into battle. And the Soviet officers are honorably justifying that trust and fulfilling their military duty with a sense of great responsibility."¹⁹

M.V. Frunze's entire life and work, like that of many of our other military chiefs of the older generation, is a model of how every officer must selflessly fulfill his military duty in order to constantly keep the Soviet Armed Forces at a high level of combat readiness and provide a reliable defense for our homeland.

FOOTNOTES

1. "M.V. Frunze. Vospominaniya družey i soratnikov" [M.V. Frunze: The Recollections of his Friends and Companions-In-Arms], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965, p 10.
2. Ibid., p 308.
3. Quoted from "Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze. Zhizn' i deyatel'nost' v fotografiyakh i dokumentakh" [Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze: His Life and Work in Photographs and Documents], Moscow, Politizdat, 1973, p 59.
4. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 42, p 130.
5. "Mikhail..." op. cit., p 68.
6. M.V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965, p 51.
7. Ibid., p 83.
8. "M.V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny. Sbornik dokumentov" [M.V. Frunze on the Civil War Fronts: Collected Documents], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1941, p 54.

9. Ibid., p 134.
10. Ibid., p 413.
11. M.V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch." [Collected Works], Moscow-Leningrad, Gosizdat, Vol I, 1929, p 401.
12. M.V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], 1965, pp 82-83.
13. M.V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol I, p 417.
14. Ibid., p 402.
15. Ibid., p 405.
16. Ibid., p 403.
17. Ibid., Vol II, 1926, p 165.
18. M.V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 497.
19. S.L. Sokolov, "Leninskiy stil' v rabote voyennykh kadrov" [The Leninist Style in the Work Performed With the Military Cadres], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983, p 46.

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MILITARY HISTORY

STRATEGIC DISINFORMATION IN ACHIEVEMENT OF SURPRISE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 85 (Signed to press 24 Jan 85) pp 74-80

[Article by Col Gen V. Meshcheryakov: "Strategic Disinformation in the Achievement of Surprise in the World War II Experience"; passages enclosed in slant-lines printed in boldface]

[Text] Disinformation has been used as a means of deception since ancient times. In military affairs it has been used and continues to be used for the deliberate dissemination of false information on plans for operations (combat actions), on the grouping, the armament and combat capability of troops (forces) for purposes of misleading the enemy with respect to one's true intentions, thereby creating better conditions for achieving success. The press, radio, television, diplomatic channels, communication facilities, false documents and so forth are used for purposes of disinformation. Disinformation measures are always carried out in combination with other methods of camouflage--concealment, simulation and feinting actions.¹

The object of disinformation is ordinarily an individual responsible for making a certain decision on the basis of intelligence available to him. If it is advantageous to the side effecting the disinformation for the enemy to leave operational reserves on a certain axis or to transfer them to another axis by a certain time, the object of the disinformation should be not the commander of the reserves, but the commander who exercises authority over the reserves. The side disseminating the false information therefore carefully studies not only the means by which reconnaissance is performed and the system for gathering and assessing information and delivering the intelligence to the military-political leadership or the command element, but also the commander himself and the command personnel upon which the final decision depends.

Past experience has shown that an aggressor who has attacked unexpectedly and taken advantage of armed forces deployed in advance achieves significant results at the very beginning of a war. States attacked by fascist Germany during World War II, for example, either suffered total defeat (Poland), capitulated without having exhausted all possibilities for resistance (Holland, Belgium, France and others), or lost considerable territory and for a certain period of time, their ability to seize the strategic initiative. When the Soviet Union was attacked on 22 June 1941, the enemy relied also on the element of surprise. For purposes of achieving it, the German fascist command devoted a great deal of attention to the

execution of a broad range of thoroughly planned strategic camouflage measures, including disinformation.

/Fascist Germany began preparations for attacking Poland with disinformation efforts in the diplomatic areas/. On 24 October 1938 Germany's Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop delivered a proposal through the Polish ambassador for "settling" German-Polish disputes: the "reunification" of Gdansk (Danzig) with the Reich, the construction of an extraterritorial Autobahn and railway through Pomorze by the Germans, and extending the 1934 Polish-German agreement (declaration) on non-aggression and a guarantee of German-Polish borders for 25 years for this purpose. It was also proposed that a "general policy with respect to Russia, based on an anti-Comintern pact" be conducted.² Ribbentrop confirmed this proposal once again on 21 March 1939. Playing on the traditional anti-Soviet sentiments of the Polish leaders, he issued instructions to his ambassador in Warsaw to announce to them that Germany and Poland could conduct a common eastern policy in the future, since the interests of the two nations in "protection against bolshevism" coincided.³ The German proposals were rejected by the Polish government. Hitler hastened to take advantage of this. He was just looking for an excuse to free himself of the German-Polish nonaggression agreement and to have a free hand with respect to Poland.

We know that the attack was preceded by a series of acts of provocation by the Hitlerites on the Polish-German border and at Danzig. In the summer of 1939 they arranged several clashes between German and Polish border guards. German aircraft violated Polish air space around 60 times during the second half of May alone. In an attempt to justify the forthcoming attack on Poland in public opinion, Hitlerite propaganda used those acts of provocation for disinformation purposes and for accusing the Poles of aggressive actions against Germany.

At a conference of Wehrmacht leaders on 22 August 1939, Hitler announced that his propaganda "would provide an excuse for unleashing a conflict." Such an excuse came in the form of an attack on the German radio station in the city of Gleiwitz, staged by SS troops and prisoners specially selected for this purpose from concentration camps and dressed in the Polish uniform.

Acting with treachery and perfidy, the Western powers used every means possible to give Hitler to understand that Germany could attack Poland and then the Soviet Union without the risk of counteraction by England or France. Those states declared war on Hitlerite Germany on 3 September not to help Poland and not for the sake of combatting fascism. They did so because Germany was feeling its power and had begun threatening its recent protectors.

All of this soon turned against England and France, however. As early as 27 September, at a conference of commanders in chief of the branches of armed forces and their chiefs of staff, Hitler ordered immediate preparations for an offensive in the west. "The purpose of the war," the Fuhrer stressed, "is to bring England to its knees and deal France a crushing defeat."⁴ The Hitlerite government regarded the total defeat of France and at least the neutralizing of England as the most important prerequisite for unleashing a war against the USSR.

In preparing for operations in the west, the German fascist command resorted to extensive political and operational-strategic disguising of the planned aggression,

putting the propaganda machine of the Hitlerite Reich and all diplomatic means of camouflage into full play. Behind the screen of numerous acts of disinformation, Hitlerite Germany's leadership made accelerated preparations for the attack. The offensive was set for the first half of November 1939. Because Germany's armed forces were not completely prepared, the beginning of the aggression was postponed with one pretext or another all the way to 10 May 1940.

The Wehrmacht command took a number of operational camouflage steps to assure that the thrust across the Ardennes would be a surprise. Special attention was devoted to misinforming the enemy. Fascist General B. Lossberg, who was on the staff of the OKV [not further identified] operations directorate at that time, later had the following to say: "Numerous rumors were fed to the enemy camp through various channels. No flagrant actions which could have aroused suspicion were permitted. Fabrications were mixed with the truth... rumors of a German 'Schlieffen Plan' for 1940 were constantly spread in numerous ways a few months prior to the offensive."⁵

In order to conceal the axis of the main thrust, the Hitlerite command did not concentrate large masses of troops in advance on the starting lines for the offensive, but distributed them over a broad front in the operational depth. The changing of headquarters and troop movement prior to the beginning of the offensive were forbidden.

During the 8 months of silence, vigilance disappeared among the Allied forces. Suffice it to say that at the beginning of May 1940, more than 15 percent of the army personnel were on leave. Confidence that the Germans would not attack reigned at higher headquarters. The offensive therefore took the Allied forces by surprise.

At 0535 on 10 May 1940, the Wehrmacht's ground forces invaded Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg. The offensive was begun with an air attack on air fields, command posts, military depots and highly important industrial centers in France, Holland and Belgium. Fascist aircraft dropped bombs on their own city of Freiburg for purposes of provocation, blaming the Belgian and Dutch aviation for the bombing.

/During preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union, the staff of the Supreme High Command of Germany's armed forces worked out a plan for concealing the concentration of Germany fascist forces in the east, along with Directive No. 21 of 18 December 1940, code-named "Barbarossa"/. Agencies of the operational and strategic leadership and the Abwehr (intelligence and counterintelligence) helped work out the plan. The Abwehr issued a special directive, signed by General Jodl on 6 September 1940, which specifically defined the disinformation objectives and missions.⁶ Among other things, it stated that preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union should be completed by 15 May 1941 and that special attention should be devoted to concealing the plans, since "premature knowledge of our preparations could result in mortal political and military damage."⁷

Directive No. 21, signed by Hitler, contained the plan for attacking the Soviet Union in its final form. This provides grounds to believe that between 18 December 1940 and 22 June 1941, all of the operations carried out or planned (shown in the table) were basically subordinate to the Barbarossa Plan and served as a cover for the concentration and deployment of assault groupings near the borders of the USSR. Fascist Germany's military-political leaders also took advantage of actual events: the war with England and the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact.

Table. Covering Operations for the Barbarossa Plan

Planned to Deliberately Mislead	Contributed to the Cover	Aided the Cover
1. "Sea Lion" (England), after November 1940	1. The war in the Balkans, April 1941 and subsequently	1. "Felix" (Spain), 1940
2. "Shark" (England), April, 1941	2. "Mercury" (The Island of Crete), May 1941	2. "Atilla" (France, Vichy), 1940
3. "Harpoon" (England), May 1941		3. "Alpine Violet" (Albania), 1940- 1941
4. Bombings of England begun in 1941		4. Bombing Operations by aircraft of the 10th Air Corps against the British Fleet in the Central Mediterranean, January 1941
		5. "Sunflower" (North Africa), February 1941

The treacherous plan of the Hitlerites was revealed most fully by the directive on strategic camouflage, issued by the OKV on 15 February 1941. It defined the objective of the disinformation in the following manner: "To conceal preparations for 'Operation Barbarossa.' It was planned to carry out the disinformation actions in two phases. The first (extending approximately to mid-April 1941) included the disguising of general military preparations not connected with the massive regrouping of forces, and the second (April-June 1941) included the camouflaging of the concentration and operational deployment of forces near the borders of the USSR.⁸

In the first phase it was planned to make the movement of troops to the borders of the USSR appear to be ordinary army movements and to create the impression that the concentration of Hitlerite formations was centered in the southern part of Poland, in Czechoslovakia and Austria, thereby misleading the Soviet command with respect to Germany's intentions. German counterintelligence was instructed to substantiate as far as possible the reasons for increasing the total numerical strength of German forces by disseminating reports that part of the formations of ground forces located in the east were being replaced and transferred to training camps for reorganization.

In order to justify the construction of new air fields, railways and highways in Poland and the rebuilding of existing ones, announcements were made in the press and by radio that this work was necessary for developing the newly gained eastern territories and would mainly be used for making commercial hauls.

In the second phase, when it would no longer be possible to conceal preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union, orders were issued to depict the concentration

and deployment of forces for the eastern campaign as phony activities carried out for purposes of diverting attention away from the planned invasion of England.

The naval landing operation, "Sea Lion" for invading England was to be conducted in good weather conditions after gaining air supremacy. It became apparent in the fall, however, that neither the air situation nor the weather could contribute to a favorable outcome. The landing operation was postponed, but the appearance of preparations for it were continued for purposes of exerting political and military pressure on England. After Hitler had made the final decision to attack the Soviet Union, operation "Sea Lion" became one of the significant disinformation operations carried out to conceal preparations for that attack.

British journalist I. Colwin, who is very familiar with the methods used by German intelligence during World War II, writes the following: "General Speidel reported to me that Hitler had set up a special secret staff to work out the plan for that operation. This could not fail to cause talk. The 9th Infantry Regiment, indoctrinated in the spirit of the Prussian Guard, was selected to conduct the landing in the area of Hastings. Rumors about this spread throughout the regiment, and everyone began talking about operation "Sea Lion". Even after it was postponed, Hitler deliberately encouraged such talk."⁹

The directive indicating the time allocated for preparations for operation "Barbarossa," which went into effect on 1 June 1941, stated the following: "The second phase of misinforming the enemy (operation 'Shark' and 'Harpoon') has begun. Its purpose is to create the impression of preparations for a landing operation on England from the coast of Norway, from the La-Manche coast and Pas-de-calais, and from Brittany. The concentration of forces in the East was to be carried out in the form of a disinformation action to conceal the landing of the forces in England."¹⁰

To make it more convincing, the bulk of the German tank and motorized divisions were temporarily left in the West and in Germany's central regions. In accordance with the operational plans, those formations were to be transferred at the very last minute before the attack on the USSR.

Radio, press releases and state receptions were used, false rumors were spread, and so forth, for disinformation purposes. The German command issued a large number of orders on the transfer "of troops from Germany's central regions to the West." In fact, 47 divisions, including 28 tank and motorized divisions were transferred east between 25 May and 22 June.¹¹

False information about the location of the troops was broadcast for the population by radio. This was done to create the impression that the elite units were on the western front and only an insignificant number of the less battleworthy were in the east.

The fascist command spread rumors to the effect that the Soviet Government was permitting German forces to be hauled through the country by rail from Poland to Persia, where they would be used to conduct combat operations in the Middle East and South Asia against England.

Not long before the attack on the USSR, instructions were issued in Berlin to prepare to receive guests from the Soviet Union, and there were even rehearsals in hoisting the Soviet flag at the government reception center.

There was extensive propaganda about the appearance of new types of weapons and transport equipment in the German army--purportedly, to support the landing operation on the British Isles--and rumors were spread about nonexistent German airborne assault corps. Goebbels wrote an article about an operation to capture the island of Crete in the spring of 1941, describing it as a rehearsal for a large airborne operation against England. When foreign correspondents transmitted the article to their agencies, he requested that it not be published in the newspapers for reasons of secrecy.

As the day for the attack on the Soviet Union approached, the German command engaged in increasingly more extensive disinformation activities. The concentration and deployment of tank and motorized divisions in the east at the beginning of June 1941 were carried out under the guise of preparing for "large maneuvers," while the press described these massive movements as an important undertaking to disguise preparations for the landing operation in England. Reports on the systematic movement of troops from Poland to Germany were deliberately "filtered through" to the press in order to create the impression that a large number of new units were arriving in the east. Such developments as the attachment of England language translators to the troop units, the printing of new British topographical maps, reference books and so forth, were supposed to confirm the forthcoming landing operation on the British Isles.

/The USA and Great Britain began planning and conducting large-scale operations to mislead the enemy with respect to their true intentions after April 1941/. Various means and methods were used, among which radio interception and decoding of conversations of the German command element should be especially pointed out. We know that even before the beginning of World War II, the British had succeeded in acquiring the technical documentation for the Enigma radio encoder, which was used in the radio communication systems of the armed forces of Germany, Italy and Japan. They succeeded in building a replica of the machine, which was code-named the "Ultra" system. By mid 1943 the "Ultra" system was processing up to 4,000 top secret messages daily.¹² It is said that Hitler's Directive No. 21 of 18 December 1940 was intercepted by means of it. Because of this, Churchill knew in advance about the change in Germany's plans with respect to England in connection with preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union.¹³ He did not fail to go on the radio on 22 June 1941, however, with the statement that "Hitler's invasion of Russian is nothing other than the prelude to an attempt to invade the British Isles."¹⁴ This was nothing other than large-scale misinforming of the Soviet Union.

Our allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition conducted a number of camouflage operations during World War II, which were designed to achieve the element of surprise through misinformation for the operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean, and for the landing of Allied forces in Normandy.¹⁵

In the spring of 1944 the American command worked out a plan of offensive operations in the Pacific Theatre. It was planned to make the main thrust in the central part of the Pacific Ocean (in the area of the Mariana Islands). On 26 May, following the approval of the strategic plan for the campaign of 1944, the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee approved a directive on steps to mislead the enemy in the war against Japan.¹⁶

The Anglo-American command's main objective in misleading the enemy was to force Japan to arrange its forces in a manner advantageous to the USA, which had its own

plans. In order to achieve this goal, the Americans exaggerated the numerical strength of their forces and concealed their intentions where no operations were planned. At the same time, they were misleading the enemy with respect to their intentions in those areas in which it was planned to conduct operations.

In view of the fact that most of the operations were planned for the area of Asia and the Pacific Ocean, it was planned to accomplish those missions primarily by misleading the enemy with respect to the sequence and the time for the beginning of the operations, and not by keeping them secret.

And so, historical experience has irrefutably proved that during fascist Germany's preparations for wars against the nations of Western Europe and the Soviet Union, and by Japan against the USA and Great Britain in the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia, the aggressors carried out a series of preplanned and carefully coordinated measures to mislead the enemy for purposes of achieving the element of surprise in the attack. Disinformation measures had a leading role in them.

At the present time, the leaders of the USA and NATO have based the entire system of operational and combat training for their armed forces on a surprise attack against the USSR. For this same purpose, they have begun deploying medium-range cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe for carrying out so-called "disarming" and "leadership-depriving" strikes against the Soviet Union. By systematically conducting large-scale exercises in all the regions of the world, including exercises in close proximity to the borders of the socialist commonwealth nations, the USA and NATO are attempting to lull peoples into lowering their vigilance and to accustom them to such operations. These exercises are of enormous scope, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish them from actual deployment of the armed forces for aggression.

By increasing the vigilance and enhancing the fighting efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces, strengthening the Warsaw Pact, and maintaining a constant state of readiness to frustrate aggression and to route the enemy in any situation in which it should unleash a war, we are fulfilling V.I. Lenin's precept on defending the socialist homeland.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 3, 1977, p 129.
2. "SSSR v bor'be za mir nakanune vtoroy mirovoy voyny. [Dokumenty i materialy" The USSR in the Struggle for Peace on the Eve of World War II: Documents and Materials], Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, pp 63, 655.
3. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1974, p 125.
4. Ibid., Vol 3, p 35.
5. "Istoriya..." op. cit., Vol 3, p 49: We know that there was a "Schliffen Plan" for 1905, which was a strategic plan of the German General Staff for conducting a war on two fronts--against France and Russia. The main concept of this plan--the swift and successive routing of the enemies in the war--was the basis for the fascist strategic concept of "Blitzkrieg War," the viciousness of which was made absolutely apparent by World War II.

6. Ibid., pp 235, 241.
7. "Strategic Military Deception," New York, Pergamon Press, 1982, p 195.
8. "Istoriya..." op. cit., Vol 3, p 241.
9. I. Colwin, "The Double Game," translated from English, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960, p 208.
10. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1959, p 83.
11. "Nachal'nyy period voyny" [The Initial Period of the War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1974, p 189.
12. A. Brown, "Bodyguard of Lies," New York, 1976, p 357.
13. William Stephenson, "A Man Called Intrepid," London, 1976, p 201.
14. PRAVDA, 23 June 1941.
15. For a more detailed account read VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1982, pp 67-73.
16. "Vnezapnost' v operatsiyakh vooruzhennykh sil SShA" [The Element of Surprise in Operations of the U.S. Armed Forces], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, p 180.

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MILITARY HISTORY

LOCAL WAR: LONG-RANGE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT VIA AVIATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 85 (Signed to press 24 Jan 85) pp 81-86

[Article by Col V. Odintsov, doctor of military sciences, professor: "Using Aviation to Provide Logistical Support for Troops, Based on Experience in Local Wars"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The extent of the materiel, transport and other needs of the troops (forces) has constantly increased with the development of military affairs, while the time available for satisfying them is being reduced to the minimum. Because of this, the armies of many states are searching for transport equipment for the rear services, which can support the troops under the most difficult conditions and within extremely short periods of time. Aviation is one such means. The experience of local wars has shown that it is possible to use aviation for transporting troops and delivering materiel over enormous distances and within short periods of times, as well as to evacuate the wounded and ill, thereby reducing the time elapsing before they receive skilled and specialized medical assistance and reducing their mortality.

In a number of local wars unleashed by aggressors since World War II, the transport aviation has been the most effective means of providing logistical support for the troops. The majority (up to 90 percent) of local wars during this period occurred in a strip of the planet between 28° north and 32° south latitude. The regions in this zone have special physical-geographical conditions and a poorly developed network of highways and railways. All of this, combined with the specific nature of the combat operations, made it acutely necessary to use the aviation for providing materiel, transport and medical support.

The experience of the local wars in Korea (1950-1953) and in Vietnam (1964-1975) is especially illustrative of this. These wars make it possible to follow the dynamics of the increasing extent to which the aviation has been used for providing logistical support, depending upon the development of the weapons and combat equipment and upon changes occurring in the techniques of combat operations.

/The Korean War/ was one of imperialism's first large-scale aggressive actions of a local nature since World War II. The aggressors used more than 1 million men, 1,000 tanks, over 1600 aircraft and more than 200 ships in that area of the planet to achieve their objectives.¹

The area of combat operations was more than 10,000 kilometers from the supply bases on the continent of the USA [sic].

Because of the mobile nature of combat operations at the beginning of the war and especially during the first period (25 June-14 September 1950), it became necessary to rush troops and freight to South Korea (to the Pusan staging area) from Japan, where the American 8th Army was based, and from the USA itself. Military air transport was used along with naval transport for accomplishing that mission. The military air transport hauled a significant number of military shipments in that war.

Around 500 transports constantly traveled the airways linking the USA, Japan and Korea. On the average they transported 7,625 people and 1,720 tons of freight from the USA to Japan each month, and 42,000 people and 25,000 tons of freight from Japan to Korea and within Korea.³ Furthermore, the volume of air transport operations was constantly growing due to the increasing intensity and scope of the military operations conducted by the American forces in Korea. While it had reached 80 tons a day by 1 August 1950, it already exceeded 100 tons at the end of that month and was continuing to grow. A total of 17,379 tons of freight had been hauled by air from the USA to Korea as of 1 October of that year. The U.S. transport aviation used the return runs for evacuating the wounded from hospitals located in Korea and Japan, which significantly accelerated the process.

Air transport operations in Korea itself (within the area of combat operations) were carried out from air fields (bases and depots) in the zone of communications to army supply points set up in corps and division rear service areas (see Figure 1). It was possible in those areas to have air fields 30-80 kilometers from the battle-line and to prepare them for receiving military transports.

The volume of air transport operations within Korea was considerably greater than from the USA to Korea. On certain days it amounted to several hundreds of tons. On 5 July 1951, for example, the 315th Air Division delivered around 900 tons of ammunition and food to the troops. This was a result of the great need for deliveries of emergency freight (anti-tank guns, machine guns, cartridges, spare parts for tanks and aircraft, storage batteries, medicine, blood and other supplies) within the area of combat operations itself. The limited materiel supplies in the forces and the fact that they were operating in a drastically changing situation, meant that they required far more emergency shipments than the army depots, for example, which had considerably larger stocks and were located in areas near South Korea's maritime ports and air fields. It was also due to the fact that the aviation had greater capabilities for delivering materiel within the theater of military operations than outside it (the distances were shorter and more trips could be made in a day). Furthermore, the mountainous and forested terrain and the poorly developed network of roads and railways in the situation of intense pressure from North Korean forces increased the need for aircraft to support the American forces in the area of their combat operations with materiel, frequent transportation (air lifting) of troops and medical supplies. A special subunit for supplying the troops by air--the 2348th Quartermaster Company, which arrived in Korea from the USA on 14 August 1950--was therefore created for the first time in military praxis.⁴ With its assistance, the aviation delivered 0.75-ton trucks, anti-tank guns, howitzers, antiaircraft pieces, fuel, water, ammunition, medical and other supplies to the troops.

Helicopters were used in Korea for the first time to provide logistics support for American forces. Due to their limited numbers, however, they were not extensively used in that war. Materiel was hauled in and the wounded were evacuated




Figure 1. Basic Diagram Showing How Logistics Were Organized for the American Forces in South Korea in 1950-1953

Key:

- | | |
|--|------------------------------|
| 1. Zone of combat operations | 6. Japan |
| 2. Communications zone | 7. USA |
| 3. Headquarters of 3rd Logistics Support Command | 8. Hawaii |
| 4. Headquarters of communications zone | 9. Phillipines |
| 5. Headquarters of 2nd Logistics Command | 10. Division logistics areas |
| | 11. Corps logistics areas |
| | 12. Army logistics area |
| | 13. One base sector |

on the battalion and regimental level primarily by human carriers, and domestic livestock (oxen and other animals) requisitioned from the local population were used in certain cases.⁵

/In the war in Vietnam/ the level of technical equipment of the troops and the complex physical and geographic conditions (tropical jungles) of the theater of military operations in combination with the specific nature of the combat operations made it necessary to use aircraft, especially helicopters, to provide logistics support for the American forces on a larger scale than in other wars--specifically, in Korea.

There were no solid fronts in the war in Vietnam. Combat operations were focalized. The forces of the two warring sides ordinarily did not have direct contact with each other. Classic operations with the participation of American field forces, like those conducted in World War II and the Korean War, were not conducted in South Vietnam. In most cases, the combat operations were airmobile operations. All of South Vietnam was broken down into four operational corps areas, with formations and units of an army corps deployed and conducting combat operations in

each. All of this necessitated a specific organization of logistics for the American forces, which had a significant effect on the use of aircraft (especially helicopters) for providing logistics support for the troops.

The area of combat operations in South Vietnam was not divided into a communications zone and a zone of combat operations as specified in U.S. army regulations for all theaters of military operations.

Four logistics zones were created for providing the American forces with logistics support. Each of them supported one army corps. Their command elements had ports, air fields, spare materiel bases and depots, repair shops, hospitals and other logistics units and facilities at their disposal within the territory of the logistics zones (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Basic Diagram of Logistics Support Provided With Planes and Helicopters for the Troops in the U.S. War in Vietnam.

Key:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Qui Nhon logistics zone | 8. Los Angeles |
| 2. From the USA, Japan and the Philippines | 9. Through Hawaii and the Philippines |
| 3. McCord | 10. Cam Ranh |
| 4. San Francisco | 11. Command element of 2nd Logistics Zone |
| 5. Logistics depots | 12. Through Alaska and Japan |
| 6. Industrial enterprises | 13. Cam Ranh logistics zone |
| 7. Travis | 14. Saigon logistics zone |

A logistics zone was divided up into two or three logistics areas, each of which supplied one division. The divisions had organic logistics units and subunits (a transport, a supply and a repair battalion).

Depending upon the scale and the plan for the operations, temporary supply zones (one-three) were set up 30-40 kilometers from the area of combat operations. Enough materiel was stocked in those zones to supply the troops (brigade and higher) for two to three days. They were delivered to the troops by area. The first and third areas coincided with logistics zones, while the second covered two zones.

These areas were serviced by the 4th Transport Command, which had two transport groups, each with several transport battalions and separate transport companies.

By using air transport, the American command element reduced the delivery time. It took freight an average of around 30 hours to go from the USA to Vietnam by air, for example, and 16 days by sea.⁷ The volume of freight delivered by air therefore constantly increased. A total of 355,000 tons of freight traveled from the USA to Vietnam by air in 1966, 550,000 in 1967.⁸ Air shipments to South Vietnam were carried out on two routes: the northern route (through Alaska to Japan) and the central route (through the Hawaiian Island and the Philippines) (See Figure 2). Freight hauled over these routes went to three air bases (Tan-Son-Nkhat, Bien Hoa and Da Nang) in South Vietnam. The Air Force's Military Air Transport Command (MATS) was charged with responsibility for delivering troops and freight by air from the continental USA to the theater of military operations.

The aviation used the territory of South Vietnam in accordance with the organizational structure of logistics for providing materiel, transport and medical support for the American troops. The 315th Air Transport Group (70 C-123 aircraft) and the 779th Airborne Squadron (16 C-130s) were activated for hauling troops and materiel from air bases to depots and the bases of logistics zones and logistics areas within the theater of military operations. From 10 to 20 individual trips by C-130s were ordinarily made to provide a day's supply of materiel for one air-mobile brigade (275 tons) for an infantry or an airborne brigade (200 each).¹⁰

With a flight density of four trips a day, four-five C130s were detailed to support one of these brigades.

Various methods of airlifting freight were extensively used in the war in Vietnam.¹¹ The trend of making massive use of helicopters for providing logistics support also took shape in that war. UH-1 light helicopters (with a hauling capacity of less than 1 ton) were used for delivering ammunition, spare parts, maintenance supplies, water and hot food from depots and bases to the troops, down to the platoon inclusive. Wounded were evacuated on the return trips. CH-47 and CH-54 helicopters (with a hauling capacity of 4.5 and 12 tons respectively) were used for delivering heavier and larger items, but only for battalions. Those helicopters evacuated unserviceable equipment from the areas of combat operations with external suspension systems.

Containers holding around 750 kilograms were used for making more effective use of the helicopters for delivering freight. One of them ordinarily contained the materiel necessary to meet a day's need of one infantry battalion.

In the war in Vietnam, helicopters were also used as a reliable means of evacuating troops in the medical support process. The U.S. military increased the number of medical helicopters, of course. There were only ten in Vietnam at the beginning of 1965, while the number had reached 55 by the end of the year.¹² More than 2500 wounded and ill were evacuated each month by helicopter.¹³ They were evacuated from the areas of military operations directly to hospitals, bypassing intermediate points. As a result, the wounded received skilled and specialized medical aid approximately an hour after they were wounded, which significantly reduced mortality in comparison with that of World War II (4.5 percent) and the war in Korea (2.6 percent). Of every thousand troops wounded in Vietnam, 989, or almost 99 percent, recovered.¹⁴ The mortality for wounded troops was therefore approximately 1 percent.

Helicopters were also extensively used for loading transport vessels in roadsteads. This was particularly necessary in Vietnam, where there was a constant shortage of ports equipped for receiving and unloading vessels.

/In the Arab-Israeli Wars/, and specifically in the 1973 war, there was a trend to use aircraft for delivering weapons and materiel to the theater of military operations as part of the military aid provided the belligerent by its allies. Between 14 October and 14 November 1973, for example, aircraft of the U.S. Military Transport Air Command made 566 trips from the USA to Israel, delivering 22,000 tons of military freight.¹⁵ The same thing was done in other local wars unleashed by the aggressors in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.

This trend was brought about by the need to swiftly replenish combat losses, which are considerably greater in contemporary local wars than in past wars. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, for example, the foreign press reports that the belligerents lost almost 50 percent of their tanks and aircraft within a short time.¹⁶ This was due to the enhanced combat capabilities of the weapons and combat equipment and to their more effective use in the battle and the operation.

Aviation was also extensively used to provide logistics support for troops in the /Anglo-Argentine conflict of 1982/. In that conflict British C-130 Hercules and VC-10 aircraft (not counting U.S. transports) made more than 600 trips and hauled more than 5,000 servicemen and 7,000 tons of freight from the mother country to Assencion Island¹⁷ helicopters were effectively used in that conflict for airlifting freight from British ships to a staging area set up near Port San Carlos, and from there to the area of combat operations.¹⁸

Experience with local wars has thus demonstrated that as weapons and combat equipment are developed and techniques for using them in combat are perfected, there is a constant increase in the need for aircraft for providing materiel, transport (airlifting personnel) and medical support (evacuation of the wounded and ill) support, as well as for performing other missions involved in logistics support. This need is greatest at the lower logistics levels, since as the fighting intensifies, it is essential for the troops to be more mobile and less weighted down with materiel supplies.

The large-scale use of aviation for providing logistics support, according to reports in the foreign press, is creating a situation in which logistics personnel and equipment in a theater of military operations can be reduced, their structure simplified and their use made more effective. It is considered possible to use aviation for delivering material to the troops, bypassing intermediate logistics points and without the concomitant freight transfer operations.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1977, p 360.
2. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1970, p 43.
4. The TOE numerical strength of a company was 86 men, including six officers. It had a special subunit of supply dropping parachutes.

5. Special workers' companies were formed for this purpose with South Koreans, each of which had 240 men.
6. At the end of 1967, American and Saigon forces in Vietnam were using more than 4500 guns and mortars, 500 tanks and as many as 4100 planes and helicopters (VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1975, p 65).
7. DATA, No 12, December, 1966, pp 13-15.
8. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 August 1974.
10. CORPS LOGISTIC PLANNING IN VIETNAM, No 8, 1968, pp 3-11.
11. SPACE AERONAUTICS, April, 1966, p 110.
12. ARMY, No 16, 1969, pp 125-128.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. MILITARY REVIEW, No 1, 1981, p 17.
16. FLIGHT, October, 1973, p 25.
17. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1983, p 69.
18. AIR ET COSMOS, No 913, 26 July 82, pp 40-52.

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MILITARY HISTORY

ARMED FORCES CHRONICLE, 1937-1938

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 85 (Signed to press 24 Jan 85) pp 91-93

[Text] 1937 (August-December)*

5 August--Decree passed by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR establishes military ranks of junior lieutenant, junior military technician and junior political instructor; corresponding insignia and uniforms introduced;

8 August--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR merges Technical Directorate of RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] with Communications Directorate of RKKA;

15 August--Decree passed by Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR ratifies "Statute on Military Commissars of the RKKA";

19 August--Directive issued by Political Directorate of RKKA on establishing permanent 4-month party courses under the political directorates of military districts for advanced training of RKKA's political personnel;

20-31 August--Air maneuvers conducted by Air Forces of RKKA involving "Operations by Air Forces of Fronts and the Air Army During the Initial Period of the War in a Situation of Extensive Operation by Fronts", general supervision of maneuvers provided by Commander 1st Rank B.M. Shaposhnikov, Chief of General Staff of RKKA;

20 August--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR establishes

*Continuation from VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL Nos. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 1966 (October 1917-December 1918) Nos. 2, 4, 6, 10, 1967 (January-December 1919); Nos. 2, 5, 9, 10, 12, 1968 (January 1920-April 1921); Nos. 2, 4, 1969 (May 1921-December 1922); Nos. 1, 6, 10, 12, 1970 (January 1923-December 1924); Nos. 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 1971 (January 1925-June 1926); Nos. 2, 6, 8, 10, 1972 (July 1926-June 1927); Nos. 1, 3, 6, 10, 12, 1973 (July 1927-December 1928); Nos. 2, 5, 7, 1974 (January-September 1929); Nos. 2, 9, 11, 1975 (October 1929-April 1930); Nos. 2, 4, 8, 10, 1976 (May-December 1930); Nos. 2, 4, 6, 8, 1977 (January 1931-May 1932); Nos. 5, 7, 9, 1978 (June 1932-June 1933); No. 12, 1979 (July-December 1933); Nos. 2, 10, 1980 (January-June 1934); Nos. 2, 7, 11, 1981 (July 1934-May 1935); Nos. 3, 7, 1982 (July 1935-February 1936); Nos. 2, 12, 1983 (February 1936-July 1937).

aviation department at Military Academy of the RKKA imeni M.V. Frunze for training chiefs of staff for air units and formations of RKKA;

1 September--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR puts into force the "Statute on the Procedure for Conferring Scientific Degrees and Ranks in the RKKA";

21-24 September--Maneuvers by Forces of Belorussian Military District held under supervision of Army Commander 1st Rank I.P. Belov, District Commander;

22 October--Order of People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR establishes academic advanced courses for command personnel of engineer troops at military engineering academy of RKKA;

17 November--Position of political directors (political instructors) introduced in companies, batteries, squadrons and equivalent subunits;

21 December--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR puts into force the "Internal Service Regulations of the RKKA, 1937";

30 December--Decree passed by Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of USSR establishes People's Commissariat of USSR Navy;--Politburo of VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] adopts decision to establish a political directorate of the navy with status of navy department of Central Committee of VKP(b).

1938 (January-June)

11 January--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR confers V.I. Lenin's name upon Military-Political Academy of RKKA;

24 January--Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet passes ukase establishing anniversary medal "20th Anniversary of Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" to commemorate 20th anniversary of RKKA and Navy; approved statute on medal, its design and description;

25 January--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR introduces deputy or assistant political instructors appointed from Komsomol members in units of RKKA;

31 January--Central Committee of VKP(b) passes decree establishing Military-Industrial Commission Under Defense Committee;

21 February--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR puts into force "Artillery Field Manual of RKKA, Part 1, Book 1, Military Artillery, 1938 (BUA-1-1-38);

26 February--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR introduces Komsomol Work Department in TOE of Political Directorate of RKKA;

28 February--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR puts into force "Drill Manual of the RKKA Infantry";

7 March--Central Committee of VKP(b) and Council of People's Commissars of USSR passes decree "On National Units and Formations of RKKA", in accordance with which Georgian 47th and 63rd, Armenian 76th and Azerbaijani 77th Division are to be formed into All-Union 47th, 63rd and 77th mountain rifle divisions;

8 March--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR puts into force Antiaircraft Artillery Combat Regulations of RKKA, Part 1, Book 1, 1938 (Combat Service of Antiaircraft Artillery Battery);

13 March--Central Committee of VKP(b) and Council of People's Commissars of USSR passed decree establishing Main Military Council of RKKA under People's Commissariat of Defense, consisting of K.Ye. Voroshilov (chairman), V.K. Blyukher, S.M. Budennyi, G.I. Kulik, L.Z. Mekhlis, I.V. Stalin, I.F. Fed'ko, B.M. Shaposhnikov, Ye.A. Shchadenko; Council charged with considering basic questions pertaining to organizational development of Red Army and strengthening of nation's defense capabilities;--Main Political Council of Navy simultaneously established, made up of P.A. Smirnov (chairman) L.M. Galler, A.A. Zhdanov, I.S. Isakov, N.G. Kuznetsov, G.I. Levchenko and others;--Central Committee of VKP(b) ratifies Statute on Komsomol Organizations in Red Army;--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR places into effect Cavalry Field Manual (BUK-38), Part 1, (Red Army man, section, platoon);

20 March--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR sets up in Military Training Directorate, Regulation Commission for Planning, Reviewing and General Coordination of Draft Regulations, Manuals and Other Official Documents Issued for all Branches of Ground and Air Forces of RKKA; statute announced;

26 March--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR disbands directorates of military educational institutions of RKKA and districts (Leningrad Military District, Belorussian Military District, Moscow Military District and Kiev Military District); Inspectorate of Military Educational Institutions established at center to replace directorates of military educational institutions, and positions of assistant commanders for VUZ's introduced in districts (Leningrad Military District, Belorussian Military District, Kiev Military District and Moscow Military District);

22 April--Order of People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR renames 1st Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division as 1st Moscow Rifle Division;

28 April--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR establishes in political directors of Kiev, Belorussian, Leningrad, Moscow and Transbaykal military districts and Special Red Banner Far East Army, Departments for Supervision of Staffs and Political Directorates of Districts Under Direct Jurisdiction of Chiefs of Political Directorates by Party and Komsomol Organizations;

11 May--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR announces Statute on Training of Scientific and Scientific-Pedagogical Cadres for RKKA (Advanced Students in Military Academies), ratified by People's Commissariat of Defense and chairman of All-Union Committee for Higher School Affairs under Council of People's Commissars of USSR;

25 May--Orders issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR puts into force Artillery Field Manual of RKKA, Part 1, Book 3, 1938 (BUA-1-4-38);

30 May--All mountain rifle divisions of Red Banner Caucasus Military District switched to new TOE; following introduced in divisions: separate antitank gun battery, separate antiaircraft machine-gun company, air communications flight; tank company and chemical defense company disbanded;

2 June--To improve management of party-political work at military academies and schools and in advanced training courses for commanders and chiefs of RKKA, order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR introduces section for supervision of party-political work at military academies and in advanced training courses of RKKA to TOE of Political Directorate of RKKA;--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR introduces positions of party bureau secretaries to TOE of central directorates of People's Commissariat of Defense;

3 June--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense on training of sharpshooters in rifle and cavalry units of RKKA;

16 June--Order issued by People's Commissariat of Defense of USSR introduces Komsomol Work Sections in TOE of district political directorates and Special Red Banner Far East Army, and position of assistant chief of political section for Komsomol work introduced to TOE of political sections of corps, divisions, brigades, academies and schools; position of instructor for Komsomol work eliminated from TOE of political sections;

28 June--Far East Front formed.

Z. Pavlova and V. Bobrova, department heads
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